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THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
A Tool of National Security and
American Diplomacy
The Military Assistance Program has been a feature of
American national strategy for nearly twenty years. It be-
gan with the Greek-Turkish Aid Program of 19^7 which was
enacted as a commitment supporting the Truman Doctrine. -This
Doctrine proclaimed an American policy of aiding any state
which was threatened by Communist aggression. The American
containment policy evolved from this first commitment of the
United States to deter Soviet expansion.
In order to implement containment , the United States
undertook the creation of extensive bilateral and multi-
lateral military alliances. Under the provisions of these
treaties, the United States agreed to extend military aid in
the form of military equipment, training, and financial sup-
port to those nations which joined the United States in
mutual defense pacts.
The early legislative acts which authorized and funded
the many military assistance programs were essentially ad hoc
laws with little planned correlation between the various pro-
grams. But in 1961, the Congress enacted a new and comprehen-
sive law which brought nearly all the foreign assistance pro-
grams, economic as well as military, under one package.
This was the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This act re-




Over the years, there has been a considerable amount
of criticism of military assistance as being ineffective,
wasteful, and a give-a-way. Much of this criticism has
originated in the Congress with the result that the suc-
cessive presidential administrations have been continually
burdened in attempting to get adequate funds for military
aid. Support of military assistance has come primarily from
the administration and the military services.
If one examines the military assistance program in
detail, it can be discovered that many vital advantages have
accrued to the United States through its use. Primarily,
it has enabled the allies of the United States to raise and
maintain enormous military establishments with which to deter
Communist expansion. It has enabled the United States to
acquire vital overseas bases. 'Through the training programs
conducted under the auspices of military aid, the United
States has been able to indoctrinate thousands of foreign
military personnel in matters of strategy, tactics, and po-
litical science. The granting of American equipment has
created a high state of standardization of Western armaments
and technology. Military aid has established military elites
in developing countries where often the military is the only
segment of the population which is capable of maintaining
political order and stability. And, certainly not the last
or least advantage, is the fact that military aid has been a
vital element in cementing the many mutual defense alliances
that the United States has so laboriously created. But

Vundoubtedly, the most important advantage of military aid is
that it has significantly contributed to the containment of
Communism. Containment has been accomplished with relatively
few limited wars and without a general world war. The only
alternative to America's containment policy,, with its vast
network of world alliances supported by military assistance,
would have been a Fortress America strategy which, in the
end, could only result in the isolation of the U.S. and the
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THE BACKGROUND OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
I. BASIC CONCEPTS
American military assistance is aid which is extended
to friendly foreign nations on the principle that the secu-
rity of the United States is interdependent with the secu-
rity of the rest of the free world. The rationale for the
Military Assistance Program can perhaps be best described
by the words of Congress
. . .
that the efforts of the United States and
other friendly countries to promote peace and
security continue to require measures of support
based upon the principle of effective self-help
and mutual aid. It is the purpose /of Congress/^
to authorize measures in the common-defense
against internal and external aggression, including
the furnishing of military assistance, upon re-
quest to friendly countries and international
organizations .1
Military assistance consists of armaments and the training
and related services required by the recipient countries
and organizations to enable them to create an effective
military force. The goal of an effective military force in
the hands of friendly countries is designed not only to
withstand aggression from without but also to enable the
recipient countries to maintain a viable and stable
1Public Law 87-195/3. 19837, Stat. 424, Sec. 502.
This act will be hereinafter citecT as "The Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961.
"

2government and withstand internal rebellion and insurrection.
Although there is a connotation of mutuality of assistance
between the United States and the recipient countries in
case of war, the immediate goal of aid to small and under-
developed nations is to promote internal stability, whereas
the purpose of assistance to larger and more developed na-
tions is to help them create and maintain large and effec-
tive military forces which would in fact be of help to the
United States in time of war. Consequently, the decision to
offer assistance to friendly foreign countries is determined
not only by the needs of the recipient countries but by
their ability to employ military forces and their ability
to pay for them. Therefore, the United States extends mili-
tary assistance by means of grant or gift, by loan or lease,
or by sale. Examples of the two extremes in the manner of
extending assistance are the case of South Vietnam and the
German Federal Republic. South Vietnam is unable to make
any purchases of military equipment from the United States
and must rely completely upon grants; whereas, the German
Federal Republic receives virtually no grant military
assistance and in recent years has made large purchases of
military equipment for cash.
In addition to this "hardware" and training assist-
ance, two other kinds of aid are granted by the United
States which are closely related to military assistance and
have as significant a bearing on American military strategy
and foreign policy as does the Military Assistance Program.
Supporting Assistance is grant or loan financial aid which

3is extended to friendly foreign countries who maintain large
military establishments but who are unable to bear the
financial cost of their armies. The best example of a
country receiving large amounts of Supporting Assistance is
the Republic of Korea. Korea today maintains the fourth
largest standing army of the world but is able to do so only
with the help of Supporting Assistance. In addition. Sup-
porting Assistance is granted to countries which are under
pressures which generate economic and political instability.
Jordan is an example of such a case. The country suffers
not only from economic underdevelopment but is also under
continual political pressure brought on by its more developed
neighbors. Supporting Assistance enables the country to
maintain its independence and viability.
The second kind of aid which complements military
assistance is that which is granted from the Contingency
Fund. This Fund is appropriated by the Congress to permit
the President to grant assistance in case of emergencies
which cannot be foreseen or forecast. The President has
wide latitude in the use of the Fund and it may be granted
for emergencies arising not only because of military or
political crises affecting friendly governments but because
of natural disasters as well. In the recent past the Fund
has been used to avert a financial crisis in Brazil, to aid
flood victims in Costa Rica, and to extend extra military

4assistance to Laos when that country was threatened by
p
renewed insurgency.
Because of the great sums of money involved in the
granting of military assistance, the relatively long time
which the United States has been engaged in the Program, and
the frustrations generated out of the failure of military
assistance to accomplish all the goals which the critics of
foreign assistance had anticipated, the Military Assistance
Program has been under continual and frequently hostile
criticism. On the other hand, the Program has had its
staunch and articulate proponents. As a result the argu-
ments concerning military assistance have ranged from
advocacy of a massive increase of all forms of assistance to
demands that all kinds of aid be eliminated. But, prior to
reaching conclusions about the 'effectiveness of military
assistance and its impact on the formulation of American
national security policy and foreign policy, it is desirable
to review American involvement in military assistance and
the genesis of the Military Assistance Program.
2Bureau of the Budget, Proposed Mutual Defense and
Development Programs FY 1966 ; Summary Presentation To The
Congress
,
(Washington: Government Printing Office, March,
iyb3), p. 200.

II EARLY AMERICAN AID PARTICIPATION
Military assistance has been a feature of warfare and
politics since ancient times. ~> It can be defined as any
materiel, financial, or personnel help for combat purposes
granted by one political entity to another. It assumes a
dependence of the grantee on the grantor and implies mutual
political and military interests. The sale of war materials
for profit purposes only is not military assistance.
Furthermore, military assistance implies common goals and
collaboration between the grantor and the recipient. Conse-
quently, an example of military assistance was the arming of
American Indians by the French during the French and Indian
War, wherein the French supplied weapons to the Indians in
return for joint, French-directed campaigns against the
British. But in later years, rifles sold by Europeans to
American Indians who used them against the American set-
tlers in the West was not military assistance because the
guns were sold for profit and there was no organized coop-
eration between the Europeans and the Indians.
Throughout the entire history of the United States,
this country has been involved in military assistance,
first as a beneficiary and today as the greatest donor in
-^For an interesting description of the historical
development of foreign assistance, see: George Liska, The
New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, lybo), pp. 36-
o4. Also see: Hans J. Morgenthau, "Preface To A Political
Theory of Foreign Aid," Why Foreign Aid? , Robert A. Goldwin,
editor (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1962), pp. 7O-89.

6history. The first aid received by the United States came
from France during the Revolutionary War and it consisted of
funds , equipment, and personnel. France lent the United
States $6.4 million and extended gifts of nearly $2 million.
In addition, the French contributed extensive military train-
ing assistance under the leadership of Lafayette and deployed
units of the French Fleet to American waters. The mission
of these French Fleet units was to deny the British Fleet
free movement in American waters and they played a decisive
role in the American victory at Yorktown.^
It is important to note that military assistance has
never been granted for altruistic or humanitarian purposes.'
At times emotional propaganda has been generated by states
in order to make the granting of aid more palatable to its
citizens; but still, aid is granted only when it ultimately
4
Benjamin H. Williams, The Economics of National
Security: Mutual Security (Washington, D.C . : Industrial
College Of The Armed Forces, January, 1961), p. 2.
5During the Battle of Yorktown in 178l--which
virtually assured American success in the Revolution—nearly
half of the American Army consisted of French troops under
Lafayette. But the deciding factor in the battle was the
French Fleet under Admiral De Grasse who, with his twenty
four ships-of-the-line, successfully interdicted in the
Chesapeake a force of nineteen British ships under the com-
mand of Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, and thus prevented the
reinforcement of General Lord Cornwallis ' British forces.
There are views offered which hold that the United
States should be and is altruistic in its foreign assistance
rather than simply selfish. But it can still be argued that
the interests of the United States are best served in a
world wherein the weaker nations can become economically
viable and militarily strong in order to oppose the spread
of and resort to Communism.

7serves the national interests of the grantor with the
corollary that the greater the aid, the more vital is the
interest of the grantor. French aid during the Revolution
is a good example of this principle. The French were not
interested in an American victory per se but rather in a
British defeat because it served French interest to prevent
British hegemony in the New World.
An interesting and significant observation which can
be made about the historical development of military
assistance concerns the direction in which the aid flows.
Until relatively modern times, the aid generally moved from
the weaker nation to the stronger, and in ancient times the
aid usually consisted of manpower supplied by weaker states
to the stronger power, frequently employed by the stronger
state in its own interests rather than in mutual interests.
With the rise of mercantilism, manpower was supplemented by
financial assistance from the weaker power to the stronger
power. Compare this system of military assistance to that
existing in the twentieth century. Today, assistance flows
from the stronger power to the weaker, and the recipient
nation frequently has a great deal of influence in the
determination of the composition and employment of the aid.
It is also a feature of modern military assistance that the
goals tend to be more strategic, longer-lasting, and ideo-
logical, whereas in the past its purpose was more limited
and directed toward winning specific campaigns, wars, and
balance of power objectives. Today, the world is charac-
terized by a proliferation of sovereignties and a continual

8power struggle between the Communist and democratic powers
with the result that the weak and emerging nations are
being courted by the superpowers. Consequently, we witness
the anomaly whereby beneficiaries of aid frequently are
able to demand assistance whereas during the Revolutionary
War the Americans were obliged to entreat the French for
sufficient help.
Ill MODERN AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
World War I marked the change of the United States
from a debtor to a creditor nation in international balance
of payments and also marked the time when the United States
became a grantor of military assistance. Even prior to
American entry into the War the United States was engaged in
helping the belligerents. At the beginning of the War the
American position was one of neutrality and the United
States was theoretically committed to neither side. Yet, in
the private sector of the economy and financial community,
trade in war materiels and financial arrangements with the
belligerents commenced as early as 1914. According to
international law, the United States was obliged, as a
neutral, to trade with the Central Powers as well as with
the Allies; but British seapower effectively prevented the
movement of German merchant vessels in the North Atlantic
and consequently United States trade was conducted virtually
entirely with the Allies. Besides trade in commodities that
were essential to the conduct of total war, huge loans were
floated by Britain and Prance in the American private

9banking sector. Though these loans did not have the approval
of the American government, and were in fact denounced early
in the war by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, the
opportunity for profit and the emotional sympathy of the mass
of the American public for the cause of the Allies enabled
Great Britain and France to borrow more than $2 billion prior
7
to the United States Declaration of War in 1917. By the end
of World War I, the total of loans to our allies amounted to
o
some $10 billion. Although, at the time, it was thought
that these loans would be repaid and thus would not consti-
tute real grant military assistance or gifts, most of the
borrowing states eventually defaulted on their loans, and in
effect the loans became grant assistance. One of the ef-
fects of the loan defaults was that it created strong
American feelings of dissatisfaction with foreign involve-
ment and it helped to cause the United States to revert to
its classic isolationism which continued to the eve of
World War II. But by 19^0, the United States was no longer
as naive in international affairs as it was in 191^-j and the
Americans became involved on the side of the Allies even
before the attack on Pearl Harbor with less concern about
the niceties and legalities of neutrality. However, what is
more important for the purposes of this study is that the
United States did not resort to the fiction of loans but
rather initiated Lend-Lease, a euphemism for gift or grant aid
'Williams, _op. cit




IV MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN WORLD WAR II
Direct American support of the Allies during World War
II commenced in September 1940 when the United States Govern-
ment concluded a deal with Great Britain under which the
British received fifty old excess American destroyers in
return for a ninety-nine year lease for air and naval bases
9
on certain British islands in the Western Hemisphere. In
addition, although there was an embargo on loans to bellig-
erents , sales of munitions were made to Great Britain for
cash through a private American corporation. On March 11,
194l, the Congress enacted legislation which became known as
The Lend- Lease Act. It gave the President wide discretionary
power to grant whatever aid he thought necessary to "any
country whose defense the President decrees vital to the
„
10
defense of the United States. Under the provisions of
this Act, the United States immediately dispatched extensive
assistance to Great Britain, and, when Germany attacked
Russia three months later, American aid was also extended to
the Soviet Union. After the United States entered the War
in December 19^-lj American military assistance was accel-
erated, and by the end of the War the total amount of aid
extended to the American Allies amounted to $48.5 billion,
the bulk of it going to the British Empire ($32 billion),
%ene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomat ic History of Europe





the Soviet Union ($11 billion), and France ($3 billion).
Although the supplies were transferred to the Allies as
"lend-lease , " payment was never expected nor solicited and
12
the assistance became grant or gift aid.
V SUMMARY
American military assistance consists of weapons,
training, and related services necessary to create a military
force which is donated, leased, or sold by the United States
to friendly foreign countries or organizations for the pur-
pose of mutual defense. In addition, the United States ex-
tends aid for essentially military purposes by use of
financial grants made available through Supporting Assistance
and the President's Contingency Fund.
Military assistance has been a feature of United
States strategy and foreign policy throughout the history of
the country. During the Revolutionary War, France granted
decisive aid to the Americans. By World War I, the United
During the same period, the United States received
$7.8 billion in reverse lend-lease. Source: Headquarters,
United States Air Force, Information and Guidance on Military
Assistance, Ninth Edition (Washington^ I965)
, p. 2. This
unclassified booklet, revised yearly, is an invaluable source
of information on military assistance. It is the "bible" of
the military services and must be studied in order to obtain a
comprehensive understanding of the history, management, legis-
lation, and regulations of military aid. It is also the
single best reference for data on the financial figures and
materiel granted to recipients.
12
For a detailed account of African military assist-
ance during World War II, see: William Adams Brown, Jr. and
Redvers Opie, American Foreign Assistance (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, VJ53T, PP^ Ii>-8l.

12
States became the donor of aid. By the end of World War II,
the United States contributed in net over $40 billion in
grants to its allies in the war against the Axis Powers.

CHAPTER II
POST WORLD WAR II MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
I THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
With the end of hostilities in 19^-5, the American
public had grown more cosmopolitan than it was in 1918 and
at last came to realize that the United States had no real
alternative but to continue its vast involvement in world
affairs. Consequently, between 19^5 and 19^8, the United
States granted over $14.5 billion in postwar rehabilitation
aid to Europe, and, although it was economic aid rather
than military assistance, it did give proof that the United
States was committed to the concept of foreign assistance and
it did serve as a precursor of new programs which were to
follow.
Unfortunately, the United States did not foresee the
inevitable confrontation with the Soviet Union nor the con-
sequence of the Cold War. As a manifestation of the American
pacifism- pugnacity syndrome, the United States promptly cut
off all military assistance to America's European allies at
the end of the War. Although cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Union was possible during the War
because of common goals, it was at best difficult. But when





American and Soviet interests diverged after the War, it was
not long before President Truman realized that cooperation
had become impossible. The Soviet Union, still exhibiting
the imperialism of old Russia and abetted by Marxist ideology,
exploited the postwar power vacuum in Europe and began its
p
campaign of expansion and subversion westward into Europe.
Only the British were aware of the dangers of Soviet moves,
but the ravages of the war left Great Britain financially
weak and militarily powerless against Soviet strength. The
British had attempted to maintain a position in Greece but,
in February 1947., announced to the United States that they
could no longer give economic or military assistance to
3Greece or Turkey. Although the British did not maintain
any troops in Turkey, they had had forces in Greece since
1944 when the Germans were driven from the country. Follow-
ing the complete Axis collapse in 1945., the Greek Communists
started a guerrilla war for the control of the country and
they were actively aided by the Communist regimes of the
bordering states. The British aided the Greek Government in
its war against the Communists, but with the British announce-
ment that they were no longer able to continue the help, it
became apparent that the Communists had an excellent chance
of winning the guerrilla campaign. President Truman
2
For a recent view of Soviet policies in Europe in the
postwar era see: Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign
Policy Reappraised (Cambridge: Harvard University J^ress,
1963).
^Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 89.
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immediately realized the plight of the Greeks and the implica-
tions of Soviet presence on the Mediterranean Sea. Conse-
quently., on March 12, 19^7* he sent a message to Congress
requesting funds for the aid of Greece and Turkey. In his
speech to Congress , President Truman said that it should be
the policy of the United States "to support free peoples who
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or
by outside pressures . . . /and to/ assist free peoples to
work out their own destinies in their own way." 1' Congres-
sional response was prompt. Legislation was enacted to give
the President power to extend substantial assistance to
Greece and also to Turkey, which was under heavy Soviet
political and propaganda pressure. This program of
assistance and its rationale became known as the Truman
Doctrine, and for the first time the United States granted
military assistance for the express purpose of countering
Communist aggression. During the course of the program,
which lasted three years, over $654 million was spent in
Greek-Turkish aid with the result that the Greeks were able
to defeat the Communist guerrillas, and the Turks were able
to develop a viable economy and counter Soviet and local
Communist subversion. The Greek-Turkish Aid Program became
one of the great American military assistance program suc-




5^Information and Guidance on Military Assistance,
op. c it




military assistance can accomplish if it is applied with
alacrity, sufficiency, and wisdom.
II CHINA AID ACT
Following the capitulation of the Japanese in 19^-5*
the United States continued its assistance to the Chinese
Nationalist Government under the provisions of the Lend-Lease
Act for the purpose of helping the Chinese evacuate the
Japanese troops and liberate the country. The amount of aid
extended during the immediate postwar period was $335
million, of which about half was military assistance.
Thereafter, American policy toward China lacked decisiveness
and direction, with the result that the United States con-
tributed in some degree to China becoming a Communist state.
This in turn, brought the entire foreign aid program under a
great deal of criticism.
The American policy goal toward China was ostensibly
designed to create a free, stable, unified, and economically
viable China. Yet the United States failed to support the
Nationalist Government to the extent required to realize the
goal. Although the entire period of postwar Chinese-American
relations is one of the most controversial episodes of modern
American diplomacy, it is possible to enumerate several fac-
tors which tended to defeat United States policy toward China
and which have had a bearing on the role of military assist-
ance as a tool of foreign policy.
Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 319.
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1. It was widely recognized that the government of
the Nationalist regime was inefficient and corrupt by Ameri-
can standards, and United States promises of aid to the
Nationalist Government were made contingent on the Govern-
ment's promise to initiate political and economic reforms.
Because of the inability and disinclination of the National-
ists to make constructive changes in their administration,
the United States withheld the aid required by the National-
ists which was necessary in order for them to establish
their authority throughout China. It was a classic case of
an American foreign policy formulated to reach an unattain-
able goal and further indicated the American propensity for
trying to export American standards of political morality.
2. The really decisive situation in China was the
militancy of the Communists. American policy makers failed
to evaluate properly the Communists' real objective which
was to capture the entire country and establish a Communist
regime throughout China. United States policy was directed
toward fostering a coalition government composed of the
Nationalists and the Communists. In order to force this
misalliance, the United States withheld effective military
aid to the Nationalists, and, by the time the United States
did act, the Communists were too strong and were able to
drive the Nationalists from the mainland.
3. Certain members of Congress were reluctant to
support a program for China which would have been as com-
prehensive and effective as the Greek-Turkish Aid Program.
They failed to realize the seriousness and imminence of a
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Communist take-over and considered that extensive aid to the
Nationalists was a waste of money.
It was not until passage of the China Aid Program of
April 19^8 that the United States granted military assis-
tance to the Chinese Nationalists. During the intervening
years since 19^5, extensive American aid was granted, but it
was economic and humanitarian relief granted in the hope of
establishing a stable Chinese government. However, the
political stability of China was dependent upon the relative
military strength of the Nationalists vis-a-vis the Commu-
nists. Because of American failure to support and expand
the Nationalist Army, the Nationalists were unable to gain a
dominant military position over the Communists and this
failure ultimately led to the establishment of a Communist
regime in China. The China Aid Act of 19^8 did grant some
•7
$463 million to the Nationalist Government,' but it was too
little and too 'late.
The Chinese debacle is frequently cited by critics of
military assistance and foreign aid as an example of the
futility and waste in aid programs. True, there are valid
reasons for believing that it was impossible to save the
Nationalist Government with any help short of massive Ameri-
can military involvement; yet, the fact remains that the
United States did not attempt everything short of American
involvement. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., an astute observer of the




Far East and an authority on American aid programs , sum-
marized the entire policy:
United States military assistance was never
extended to the Nationalists for the express pur-
pose of defeating the Communists. . . . Unwilling
to make the kind of drain on the emaciated, postwar
,
United States forces which a broad military program
would have entailed, and loath to risk American
embroilment in the ' fraticidal war, ' we never ex-
tended the degree of supervision, instruction, and
advice required by the situation.
Possibly no amount of military aid after World
War II short of massive troop intervention could
have prevented the ultimate triumph of the Com-
munists in China. Be that as it may, the tool of




In preparation for granting independence to the
Philippines, which occurred on July 4, 1946, the United
States undertook to extend both economic and military
assistance to the Islands. The Philippine Military Assis-
tance Act was approved on June 26, 1946. The Act was
designed to enable the new Republic to rebuild its army,
which was largely destroyed during the war, in order to
replace the contingents of American troops which had been
stationed in the Philippines since the turn of the century.
One feature of the Act required the Philippine Government to
agree to allow the United States to receive a ninety-nine
year lease on fifteen military bases in the Islands for
o
Amos A. Jordan, Jr., "Military Assistance and
National Policy," Crbis




mutual protection and maintenance of the peace in the
Pacific. This concept of mutual assistance eventually be-
came an integral part of all subsequent regional alliances,,
bilateral military treaties, and military assistance agree-
ments. The amount of aid granted under the Philippine
Military Assistance Act amounted to $19.8 million.
Yet, the assistance rendered to the Philippines under
programs of war rehabilitation, economic aid, and the
Philippine Military Assistance Act of 1946 failed to enable
the new nation to establish a democratic and stable govern-
ment. By 1950 the United States had poured nearly $2.0
billion into the country. Still, the Government was under
grave threat of collapse because of a guerrilla war which
was being carried on against the Government by the Communist
Hukbalahap (HUKS). Consequently, in 1950 the United States
extended another $250 million in grants and credits to be
expended over a five year program.
These funds, essentially Supporting Assistance, were
spent largely for military equipment and military operating
costs, and together with the dynamic military and political
leadership of Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay, enabled the
Government to defeat the Communist rebellion. One of the
Q
Charles Wolf, Jr., Foreign Aid : Theory and Practice
in Southern Asia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Uni-










most Interesting aspects of the aid to the Philippines,
which resulted in the creation of an effective ant Iguerr ilia
army, was the new military and political strategy initiated
by Magsaysay. His program involved the military tactic of
seeking out and destroying the HUKS, Infiltrating their ranks
with loyal troops, and extending amnesty and assistance to
HUK members who would defect. In addition, he started an
aggressive anti-Communist psychological warfare campaign
against the guerrillas which eventually separated the guer-
rillas from the people. Magsaysay established land reform,
eliminated many of the political abuses which alienated the
people against the Government, and opened new virgin lands
for resettlement of peasants and rehabilitated HUKS . His
program also made use of the army in nonmilitary tasks for
purposes of civil construction, resettlement of the peasants,
and rehabilitation of the country's war ravages. In short,
Magsaysay developed the first Civic Action program which
made use of American military assistance. The success of the
Magsaysay effort served to demonstrate the value of Civic
Action and has led to great emphasis on Civic Action through-
12
out the world.
12For a detailed review of the Civic Action program
in the Philippines, see: Harry F. Walterhouse, A Time To
Build (Columbia, South Carolina: University of ^outh
Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 83-90.
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IV AID TO IRAN
During World War II, both the United States and the
Soviet Union deployed military contingents in Iran. The
mission of these troops was to maintain and operate the
routes over which the enormous American Lend-Lease shipments
to the Soviet Union were transferred. At the end of the War,
the Soviets were in occupation of the northern part of Iran,
and the Americans were in the southern area of the country.
In accordance with the Declaration of Teheran, which
announced a policy of independence for Iran, the United
States withdrew Its troops promptly following the end of the
war In Europe. But the Soviets were not as cooperative. As
a result, the Iranian Government, on January 19 s 19^6,
petitioned the Security Council of the United Nations to
insure the withdrawal of the Soviet troops because they were
interferring in the internal affairs of Iran. Although the
Soviets attempted, by means of parliamentary maneuvers, to
circumvent the Security Council's recommendation to withdraw,
eventually they did so, and in early May 1946 , Iran reported
to the Security Council that the Soviet units had departed
the country. However, the Soviets did not cease applying
political pressures on Iran for political and mineral con-
cessions. Consequently, the United States embarked, in June
19^7, on a policy to assist the Iranian Government maintain
its internal security and order which was being undermined by
Soviet subversion. To support this policy, the United States
made a commitment to extend credits to Iran in order that
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American military supplies could be purchased. The equipment
which was obtained by Iran consisted of light armaments, use-
ful only for internal security purposes. By August 1949*
some $26.5 million worth of materiel was sent to Iran for
which that government paid $5.2 million. This equipment
,
and the help of a small American military mission numbering
twenty-six officers and men, enabled Iran to establish an
effective police organization which was able to establish
order within the country and check Soviet subversion.
V SUMMARY
The Greek-Turkish Aid Program of 1947, The China Aid
Act of 19^8, the Philippine Military Assistance Act of 1946
and its subsequent Supporting Assistance Program of 1950, and
the Iranian aid policy of 1947* were all essentially ad hoc
,
stop- gap programs designed to help former wartime allies re-
establish stable and independent governments. Of the four,
the Philippine, the Greek-Turkish, and the Iranian programs
became notable successes. Greece and the Philippines were
eventually able to destroy the Communist guerrillas, and the
Turks and Iranians were able to maintain their integrity and
independence from Soviet influence.
The China program can only be described as a debacle.
It served to demonstrate that only with an adequate military
assistance program, a comprehensive American strategic and
foreign policy, and a determined beneficiary government, can
-'Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 445.
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Communist subversion and infiltration be defeated. But some
lessons were learned by the United States as a result of
these programs
_,
and they led to the far more effective con-
tainment policy and alliance system of mutual security.
During the period following World War II, Korea also
received extensive American assistance, but the Korean




I THE RIO PACT
The first multilateral military alliance which the
United States entered, following World War II, was the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which became known
as the Rio Pact. This treaty was offered for signature on
September 2, 19^7^ at Rio de Janeiro and entered into force
for the United States on December 3, 19^8--thus preceding the
Charter of the Organization of American States. The formula
for mutual assistance was contained in the concept that an
attack on one of the signatory states would be considered as
an attack on all of the states. This same concept was later
to be incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Rio Pact is more important politically than mili-
tarily, and this fact is shown by the relatively small
amounts of military aid which have been extended to the
Latin American States. In the years from 19^8 to 1959.,
military assistance sent to Latin America amounted to but
$235 million, and the total between the years from the
For full text see: United States Congress, House,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Provisions Relating
To The Use Of United States Forces For Mutual Defense , t)4th
Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing
Office, December 27, 1956), p. 12.
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signing of the Rio Pact through fiscal year 1964 reached but
$660 million. The significance of these figures can be seen
when compared to a total of over $31.7 billion in military
assistance granted by the United States in all regions of
the world since 1948. The military aid to Latin America
has constituted less than 2 per cent of all forms of American
military assistance.
The amount of military aid to Latin America has been
small because of four basic reasons. In the first place,
Latin America has been relatively free from Communist
aggression and subversion in comparison with other parts of
the world, notably the Par East and Eastern Europe. Conse-
quently, the need for large military forces in South
America has not existed, and concomitantly, the requirement
for military aid has been small. Secondly, there is a great
reluctance on the part of Congress to appropriate large sums
for Latin American countries for fear that large Latin mili-
tary establishments may lead to conflicts between some of the
Latin States which still harbor old animosities against each
other. Thirdly, many members of Congress have expressed
great concern about the lack of really free democratic gov-
ernments in Latin America and are highly critical of the
military dictatorships which are so common in Latin America.
2Source: Bureau of the Budget, Proposed Mutual De-
fense and Development Programs FY 1966 : Summary ires enTTat ion
to the congress ( wasTTington, D.TJ7: OTS. Government PrThTTng
-




In the view of Congress, large military organizations would
only lead to greater power in the hands of Latin militarists
and hinder the evolution of really democratic governments.
This anxiety of the Congress is demonstrated by the in-
clusion of Sec 511 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act which
sets a statutory limit of $55 million in military aid which
may be granted to all of the Latin American states in any
fiscal year. And finally, because prestige and pride is such
a thoroughly ingrained characteristic of the Latin person-
ality, American policy makers have been hesitant to help any
Latin country create any military force which is significantly
larger than those of neighboring states of similar size for
fear of starting an arms race and creating prestige or show-
piece armies, navies, and air forces.
In view of the above, does it therefore follow that
any American military assistance to Latin America is inef-
fective and wasteful? The answer is no--and for several
reasons. Latin American military forces are becoming more
effective each year and are therefore more valuable for
4
For a detailed account of the history of militarism
in Latin America, see: Edwin Lieuwen, Arms And Politics
In Latin Amer ic
a
(second edition; New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 19b 1} . A shorter and more recent work on the same
topic is: Edwin Lieuwen, Generals VS. Presidents (New





meaningful mutual defense assistance employment. This is
particularly true of Latin navies which are developing into
forces designed to meet wartime commitments that the Latin
states are likely to encounter in the future. Today, these
navies are stressing oceanography, coastal patrol tactics,
and antisubmarine warfare. With but several exceptions,
5
It appears to be the view of most Latin American
authorities that the Latin military services have no real
capability in mutual defense employment. As an example,
Peter Nehemkis categorically states that Latin services are
useless for such a purpose: "Latin America's armies, navies,
and air forces have no role to play in the defense of the
Western Hemisphere against thermonuclear attack.
. . .
The
only legitimate mission of Latin America's armed forces is
internal security." Edwin Lieuwin, in his two previously
cited works, generally holds the same view. But there are
contrary opinions offered. J. Lloyd Mecham argues that the
military services of the major Latin states have the capa-
bility to ".
. .
maintain order and prevent subversive
activities, defend vital military and economic installations,
provide sea and air submarine patrols, keep communications
open, and produce . . . components of economic defense. . . .
Latin America's assuming of these continental military respon-
sibilities would free United States troops for service
/elsewhere/7'." In his conclusion, Mecham names Lieuwin and
rejects hTs contention that collective defense in Latin
America has little practical application.
In addition to the views held by the above authori-
ties, this researcher has obtained some information on this
subject from several American military officers who have
been associated with Latin military services during the past
several years as members of military missions and partici-
pants in combined exercises. It has been the consensus of
these officers that the military services of the major Latin
states are improving their military capabilities and could
provide a limited, but valuable, mutual defense contribution.
This is particularly true of the major Latin navies. Sources:
Lieuwin, Arms and Politics In Latin America , Ibid., p. 214;
Peter Nehemkis, LaHTin America (lMew York: A"lfred A. Knopf,
1964), p. 147; j. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-
Amer ic an Security
, 1889-1960 (Austin, Texas : University of
Texas Press, 1961 ) , p. 334.
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Latin America's capital ships are obsolete and there has
been little interest in replacing the several aging
cruisers. As additions and replacements are made to these
navies, the emphasis is being placed on acquiring destroyer-
type vessels which are the backbone of antisubmarine war-
fare forces. These destroyer navies, enhanced by modern
American naval equipment, American training, and joint
Latin-United States training exercises, are becoming a
significant force which can be effectively employed against
the most dangerous external military threat to Latin America-
Soviet submarines.
There are additional advantages accruing to the United
States as a result of military assistance to Latin America--
such as improved internal defense capabilities, increased
communication between members of the Rio Pact, better under-
standing of global strategy, development of civic action
projects by Latin armies--but these will be treated in more
detail in the subsequent chapters dealing with the evalua-
tion of military assistance and its effect on national
security planning and foreign policy.
II THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
With the defeat of the Axis Powers in 1945 there was
born, throughout most of the world, a hope for universal
peace, stability, and justice. But the immediate elation of
victory, with its anticipated rewards, was soon to be tem-
pered by a gnawing suspicion that the hopes were premature.
The forced camaraderie and cooperation which existed between
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the democracies and the Soviet Union during the war was soon
strained by the intransigeance of the Soviets in the late
months of 19^5. The antagonism and distrust between East
and West grew in an ever- increasing wave. The hopes and
plans for free elections in eastern Europe were destroyed by
the occupation and might of the Red Army which soon estab-
lished puppet regimes in the eastern European states. Other
examples of Soviet belligerence quickly became apparent
:
Soviet attempts to subvert Iran, support of the Greek guer-
rillas., pressures brought to bear on Turkey for concessions
in the Straits, and refusal to carry out the spirit of the
wartime agreements to permit the peoples of Europe to choose
their own forms of government. These Soviet actions cul-
minated in the Czechoslovakian coup of February 19^8, which
resulted in the establishment of a Communist government
,
replacing one that has been described as "a compromise
between Eastern socialism and Western democracy."" This
particular case of Soviet imperialism served as the catalyst
for the signing of the Western Union Defense Organization
which occurred on March 17 > 19^8. This treaty declared that
in the event of an armed attack in Europe against one of the
parties, the others would give all the assistance in their
7power. The treaty became known as the Brussels Pact and
F. Lee Benns and Mary Elisabeth Seldon, Europe: 1939
to the Present (New York: Meredith Publishing Company , 1965).
p7 '226.
7
'Donovan Paul Yeull, Jr., "United States Military
Aid," (unpublished Master's thesis, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 80.
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was signed by Belgium,, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom. The significance of the Czech coup
was not only that it marked the fall of that country into
the Soviet orbit, or that it can be considered to indicate
the start of the Cold War, but that it led to the formation
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a successor of
the Western Union Defense Organization.
It was immediately apparent to the Western European
powers that they would be unable to muster forces which
would be adequate to protect themselves against a conven-
tional attack from the Soviet Union. Nor could their mili-
tary forces serve as a credible deterrent against con-
tinued Soviet attempts at subversion in countries still
outside the Soviet orbit. Help would have to be obtained
from the United States, and France became the first nation
to request American assistance. In September 1948 the
President authorized transfer of some military supplies to
the French in order that they could reinforce their three
divisions which were on occupation duty in Germany. Yet,
ad hoc military support of the several member nations of the
Western Union Defense Organization was not an efficient
solution to the problem of arming Europe for its own defense.
Therefore, it became necessary that the United States
formally join in an arrangement designed for collective
security. On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was
signed in Washington by the members of the Western Union
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Defense Organization and the United States, Italy, Portugal,
o
Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Canada.
There are three significant aspects of the North
Atlantic Treaty which are germane to this study. First is
the concept of mutual security whereby an attack on one of
the member states within the European and North Atlantic
Q
area would be considered as attack against all of the mem-
bers. Such an attack would create an obligation on every
member to assist the aggrieved state with all its military
power. Secondly, the Treaty led to an elaborate organiza-
tion which became known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, or NATO. One of the organs which was developed was
the combined operational military command--Allied Command
Europe--which included forces from all the member states
except Iceland, which has no military services. This com-
mand is the major military deterrent of NATO against
aggression in Europe. Thirdly, the North Atlantic
o
Subsequently, Greece, Turkey, and the German Federal
Republic became members. For full text of the treaty see:
United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Treaty Provisions Relating To The Use of United States Forces
For Mutual Defense^ 84th. Congress" 2~ricT7 Session (Washington:
TJovernment Printing Office, March 27, 1956), p. 17.
9The Treaty did not obligate the members to come to
the assistance of another member who had incurred military
obligations outside the North Atlantic area. Consequently,
NATO members were not obliged to come to the assistance of
the United States during the Korean War as a consequence of
NATO membership. All operations of NATO members in Korea




For a brief, but detailed, account of the evolution of
NATO, see: Political and Economic Planning (PEP), European




Treaty committed the United States to extend military assist-
ance to both the NATO infrastructure and the member nations.
As a result of this obligation, the United States embarked
on its enormous and comprehensive Military Assistance
Program.
Shortly after the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty, the President announced to Congress that he would
request funds in order to carry out the military assistance
obligations incurred by the Treaty. The President called for
three kinds of aid: (l) machinery and materials to permit
Europe to increase its own production of military items
without seriously interfering with economic recovery; (2)
direct transfer of military equipment; and (3) expert help
in the production and use of military equipment and the
training of personnel. As a, result of this Presidential
request, the Congress enacted, on October 6, 19^9^ the
Mutual Defense 'Assistance Act. This Act gave the President
the authority to initiate aid programs to NATO members and
the NATO infrastructure, and it was the first legislation
which consolidated the various ad hoc military assistance
programs which were already in existence. It provided the
basic rationale for all the world-wide mutual security and
military assistance programs which exist to this day.
During the first year of operation, 1950, the United
States extended military grants in the amount of $217 million
Information and Guidance on Military Assistance,
op. c it





to NATO member countries. In 1951* the dollar figure of
military assistance rose to $800 million, followed by
$2.0 billion in 1952. By 1953, the total reached $2.8
billion. 3 These figures reflected the dynamic growth of
NATO military power. It also indicated the sharp rise in
the Western bloc rearmament program which was occasioned by
the Communist aggression in Korea and by Soviet and Chinese
belligerence and intransigence in general throughout the
world.
Since 1953* the amount of military assistance to
Europe has continually decreased until during calender year
1964 only $600 million in military aid was programmed for
NATO use.
This trend of decreasing military assistance to
Europe has two important implications . It shows how mili-
tary assistance can and does act as a catalyst in the crea-
tion of effective military forces. Also* it indicates that
military assistance need not be perpetual. Partly as a
result of American aid, Europe has been able to build its
1?Williams, _op. cit
. , p. 12.
13
-^Bureau of Budget, Proposed Mutual Defense and
Development Programs FY 1966^ op. cit., p. 196.
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own respectable military establishments, and the United
States has been able to direct its attention to other more
critical areas of the world.
Furthermore, the trend indicates that Communist pres-
sures will be diverted when firmly opposed. As a result of
the enormous growth of NATO strength, the Communist powers
were forced to look elsewhere to implement their expansion
policies. The result was Communist aggression in the Far
East
.
Ill ANZUS, SEATO, AND CENTO
In addition to NATO, the United States is a member of
two other mutual security alliances. In San Francisco on
15
September 1, 1951* the United States, Australia, and New
Zealand signed a mutual security pact which has become known
as the ANZUS' Treaty. It entered into force for the United
States on April 29, 1952. Although the Pact is ostensibly a
mutual defense agreement, in essence it is an American agree-
ment to guarantee the integrity of both Australia and New
14
Even during 1953* when American aid reached its
high point of $2.8 billion, the total defense expenditure for
defense purposes of all NATO countries was $11.4 billion.
Thus the United States contributed something more than 24 per
cent of the total NATO costs. By 1964, the total expenditure
for defense purposes of all NATO members had reached $19.7
billion and the American contribution of $600 million con-
stituted but 3 per cent of this amount. Source: Bureau of
Budget , Proposed Mut ual Defense and Development Programs
FY 1966
, p. 196.
15For the full text, see: United States Congress,
Treaty Provisions, op. cit., p. 22.
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Zealand. Because there has been no overt aggression di-
rected against either Australia or New Zealand and because
of the relatively high national wealth of both countries,
the United States has been obliged to extend a minimum of
military assistance to either of the other two members.
The cumulative amount extended to both countries to date is
$109.4 million. The cooperation which has resulted from
the treaty has been primarily of an administrative and con-
sultative nature , although through the years a number of
joint naval and air exercises have been conducted by the
member states.
The importance of ANZUS for the United States lies in
the fact that by the pact, the United States has gained two
staunch political allies in an area of the world that is
greatly dominated by China and' the populous "neutralist"
nations of India and Indonesia. The pact enables the United
States to maintain a presence in an area which, because of
the political instability of Indonesia, could become the
tinder box of Oceanic Asia.
The other mutual security treaty which the United
States has joined is the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, or SEATO. The pact was signed at Manila on Septem-
ber 8, 1954, and entered into force for the United States on
16
Bureau of the Budget, Proposed Mut ual Defense and




February 8, 1955. By its provisions, the United States has
agreed to come to the assistance of any of the member states
in the event of an armed attack initiated by Communist
1 P
forces. Military assistance granted to member nations , as
members of SEATO, has been limited to Pakistan, Thailand,
and Philippines . Thus far the Philippines has received
$312.4 million and protocol member Cambodia received
$89.7 million in military aid through fiscal year 1964.
Military aid figures for the other SEATO members are still
classified.
In addition to the above alliances, the United States,
although not a formal member, maintains a consultative and
associate relationship with the Baghdad Pact. This agreement,
also known as the Central Treaty or CENTO, was signed at
17
Member states are: Australia, France, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United
States. For the full text of the treaty, see: United States
Congress, Treaty Provisions , op . cit . , p. 26.
18
In a protocol, signed on the same day as the treaty,
the states of Cambodia and Laos, and the free territory
under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam, are con-
sidered to be areas protected from Communist aggression in
the same manner as the territory of the member states. Ibid.,
p. 28.
19
-'Bureau of the Budget, Proposed Mutual Defense and
Development Programs FY 1966, op. cit., pp. 2~2~6 -22b.
20
In November 19&3, Cambodia announced it would no
longer accept any American aid and thus far aid has not been
resumed. In May 19&5, Cambodia broke diplomatic relations
with the United States. Source: Norman D. Palmer, "The
Challenge for Aid in Asia," Current
'
History
, Vol. 51, No.




London on July 28, 1958. The United States has not ex-
tended military assistance to CENTO members as such, but has
granted aid to member nations under other treaty commitments
or on an ad hoc basis. Military assistance, since 19^-8,
granted to states which are members of CENTO are as follows:
Iran, $677.3 million; Turkey, $2,330.6 million; United
Kingdom, $1,034.8 million. The figure for Pakistan is
still classified.
IV SUMMARY
In order to forge an effective political and military
alliance to contain Communist expansion and subversion, the
United States created several multilateral mutual defense
treaties. The first to be concluded was the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Pact. It
entered into force on December 3* 19^8. Military aid
granted to Latin countries has been relatively small because
of the absence of serious threats of aggression and subver-
sion in the member states.
On March 17., 19^8, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom formed the Western
Union Defense Organization (known as the Brussels Pact) in
21Member states of CENTO are Iran, Pakistan, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom. Iraq, an original member has since
withdrawn from the Pact.
22
Source: Bureau of the Budget, Proposed Mutual
Defense and Development Programs FY 1966" op. cit~
pp. 22b -"528. —
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order to counter the increasing Soviet military strength
and political pressures. Because it was apparent to the
members of the Brussels Pact that they were unable to create
a credible military deterrent against the Soviet Union,, and
because of the impact of the Czechoslovakian coup d'etat,
the United States was requested to join the Organization.
As a consequence, a new arrangement was formed and the North
Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 19^9. The Treaty
created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO,
and membership was expanded to include several other states:
Italy, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Canada.
During the early years of NATO, the United States extended
vast amounts of military assistance to the Organization and
the member states. But, as Europe grew more economically
self-sufficient, American aid decreased until today it is
minimal
.
The United States maintains membership in two other
multilateral mutual defense alliances, ANZUS and -SEATO.
In the ANZUS Treaty, the United States joined Australia and
New Zealand on September 1, 1951, in originating a mutual
defense pact for the Oceania area. Because of the relative
wealth of these two states, and the absence of direct
threats of Communist aggression, military assistance to
these two states has been small.
On September 8, 1954, the United States combined with
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Thailand, and the United Kingdom to form the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty, or SEATO. The members of this
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organization have received considerable amounts of military
assistance,, but the exact figures are still classified.
Although not a member of the Baghdad Pact., which was
formed on February 24, 1955, the United States maintains an
associate relationship with the organization. Iraq, an
original member, has since withdrawn from the Pact, but
present members and associates include Turkey, Iran, Pakis-
tan, and the United Kingdom. The United States has ex-






In addition to the previously described multilateral
mutual defense alliances , the United States has concluded
several bilateral mutual defense agreements with states




On August 30, 1951, there was signed, in Washington,
the Mutual Defense Treaty Between The United States Of
America And The Republic Of The Philippines. The agreement
requires that in event of an armed attack in the Pacific,
the two countries will act together to meet the common
threat. Furthermore, both states are under obligation to
develop, separately and jointly, their individual and col-
lective capacity to resist armed aggression. Consequently,
the United States has entered a formal pact which obligates
it to extend military assistance to the Philippines. It has
been pointed out previously that the total amount of Ameri-
can military assistance to the Philippines has been $312.4
For the full text, see: United States Congress,
Treaty Provisions, op. cit., p. 24.
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million, and in fiscal 1964 the country will receive $10.7
2
million in arms aid from the United States.
II JAPAN
In San Francisco, on September 8, 1951* the Security
Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan was
signed, and it entered into force on April 28, 1952. By the
terms of the treaty, the United States is granted the right
to dispose military forces in and around Japan for mutual
security of the two states and the internal security of
Japan. In the event of hostilities around the area of Japan,
both countries are obligated to consult with each other to
determine the courses of action best suited to counter the
threatened or overt actions of any third parties. The
treaty further contemplates that in the future Japan would
be able to develop its own security forces and, in order to
assist in this endeavor, the United States has contributed
4 ^i
extensive military assistance. During fiscal year 1964,
military assistance to Japan amounted to $53.4 million, and




Bureau of Budget, op. cit., p. 227-
3For the full text of the treaty, see: United States
Congress, Treaty Provisions
, op . cit., p. 21.
4
~ '
For an informative article on the subject, see:
Lieutenant General Masatake Okumiya, " Japan : s Self-Defense
Forces," United States Naval Institute Proceedings
, Vol. 91,
No. 12 (December, T§65), pp. 25-35.
5Bureau of the Budget, op. cit., p. 227.
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III THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Following the defeat of Japan in 1945, the United
States and the Soviet Union occupied Korea for the purpose
of repatriating the Japanese military and civilian personnel.
It was agreed between the two countries that the dividing
line for the administration of Japanese repatriation would
be the thirty-eighth parallel, with the Soviet Army working
north of the parallel and the United States Army to the
south. But, the Soviets followed the same policy as they
did with conquered states in Europe. They used their mili-
tary power to establish a Communist regime in their zone of
Korea, and they created a large, well-equipped, Soviet Korean
army.
This Soviet policy was contrary to the Potsdam Declara-
tion wherein the Allies agreed that Korea should be free and
6
independent. The United States attempted to negotiate with
the Soviets for free Korean elections to be followed by with-
drawal of American and Soviet troops and unification of the
country. But no agreement could be reached. Thereafter, a
United Nations commission attempted to mediate the negotia-
tions and supervise nation-wide elections but the Soviets
prohibited the commission from entering Soviet-occupied
Korea. Consequently, elections were held only in southern
Korea in May 1948. As a result, an independent Republic of
Korea was established south of the thirty-eighth parallel,
Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 372.
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and the new state was recognized by the United States in
7
January 1949. Thereafter, the partition of Korea became a
permanent fact.
From 1945, the United States granted extensive eco-
nomic assistance to Korea to help the country build a viable
economy and government. In addition, during the years be-
tween 1945 and 19^-8, the United States stationed troops in
southern Korea to maintain internal order. At the same time,
the South Koreans were provided some small military arms in
order to help them form a civilian police force and militia.
Following American recognition of the Republic of Korea, the
United States began to remove its troops from the country,
and, except for a small military advisory group, American
troop evacuation was completed by June 1949.
Because it was known that the Soviet Union had
o
equipped an army of 125,000 men in North Korea, it was
apparent that the Republic of Korea would have to enlarge
its militia and create an effective army for external
defense when American troops departed. Therefore, under the
terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the
Republic of Korea was allotted $27.6 million, in military
assistance, not a large figure in comparison with $654








military supplies scheduled for Korean delivery was received
prior to the invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans on
June 25, 1950.
The story of the Korean War is beyond the scope of
this study, yet, there is one aspect of it which is par-
ticularly appropriate. It is the lesson which should be
obvious. It concerns the timeliness of military assistance.
Had the United States invested as much in military aid to
South Korea as it did in the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, it is
not unreasonable to conclude that the North Koreans and
Chinese might have been deterred from starting and partici-
pating in the War. It is true that one of the Communist aims
was to test the will of the United States, but it is also
true that the Communists expected that North Korea could win
a quick and easy victory. Had the United States been as
industrious in equipping a South Korean army as had the
Russians been in arming North Korea, the War may have been
averted and over 137,000 American casualties prevented.
Although the United States failed to avert the
Korean conflict, it did take action after the July 1953
armistice to indicate that the United States would stand
committed to defend Korea in the future. On October 1, 1953,
the Mutual Defense Treaty Between The United States Of America
And The Republic Of Korea was signed in Washington, and it
entered into force on November 17, 1954.
Congress, Treaty Provisions, op. cit., p. 25.
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The Treaty obligates both states to act together to
oppose external aggression against any territory under the
administration of either state in the Pacific area. Under
the terms of the Treaty, the United States received rights
to deploy American forces in and about South Korea, and in
return the United States would take actions to deter external
aggression against Korea. Among other obligations, tacitly
incurred, was the requirement to extend continuing economic
aid, military assistance, and Supporting Assistance. In
1964, the United States granted some $76 million in Support-
ing Assistance. The yearly amount of this quasi-military
aid has continually decreased from a high of $320 million in
1956. This decrease reflects the improving economy of the
Republic of Korea which allows the Koreans to shoulder a
greater part of their own defense burden. In fiscal 1964,
military assistance to Korea amounted to $124.4 million, and
the total granted to that country since 1948 is $2,135
million. 12
IV THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
After the Chinese Nationalists retired from the
Asiatic mainland in 1949 3 the credits and equipment
Bureau of the Budget, op. cit
. , p. 199.
12Ibid., p. 227. This figure does not include the
costs of the Korean War. During that conflict all military
costs in Korea were borne by Department of Defense appropria-
tions rather than by foreign aid legislation. Harold A.
Hovey, United States Military Assistance (New York: Freder-
ick A. Praeger, iy6^), p. 24.
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scheduled for military assistance under the China Aid Act of
1948 were extended to the Nationalists on Formosa. These
supplies were exhausted by January 1950. 3 Thereafter, be-
cause United States policy makers considered the Nationalists
safe from further Chinese Communist attack, no more funds
were immediately appropriated for Nationalist military aid.
But with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950,
the strategic position and defense of Formosa was reevaluated
In August of 1950, a military investigatory mission was dis-
patched to Formosa to determine the adequacy of the Formosan
defenses. As a result of the mission's report, a United
States military advisory group was sent to the island in
14
May 1951. Thereafter, the United States embarked on a
comprehensive and determined program to build an adequate
and effective Chinese Nationalist military establishment.
Between May 1951 and October i960, the United States con-
tributed nearly $2 billion in military assistance to
15Formosa.
As a result of the increasing United States commit-
ment to the Chinese, and in order to more clearly define
American policy, the United States negotiated a mutual de-
fense pact with the Nationalist Government. On December 2,
13





15John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid,
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19b 2 J, ig7~2B~.
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1954, the Mutual Defense Treaty Between The United States Of
America And The Republic Of China was signed in Washington.
The treaty, which entered into force on March 3* 1955,
contains the same essential points as other mutual defense
treaties. It affirms that in event of armed attack upon any
territories under the administration of either Government in
the Western Pacific Area, both states would act together to
meet the common danger. In addition, both states agreed to
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity
to resist armed attack and Communist subversion. As a re-
sult of this commitment, the United States has obligated
itself to extend continual and substantial military aid.
In fiscal 1964, $128.1 million was appropriated for military
assistance to the Republic of China, and since 1948, the
total has been $2,245 million. ^
V SUMMARY
Supplementing the several multilateral mutual defense
alliances discussed in Chapter III, the United States has
concluded a number of bilateral defense treaties.
The first major pact was formed with the Philippines
on August 30, 1951. As a result of this agreement, and be-
cause of Philippine membership in SEATO, the United States
has extended a considerable amount of military aid.





17Bureau of the Budget, op. cit., p. 227.
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Shortly thereafter, the United States and Japan formu-
lated a mutual defense arrangement. As a result of this
pact, the United States has extended large amounts of mili-
tary assistance to help Japan build its three Self-Defense
Forces, a euphemism for a conventional military establish-
ment
.
Following the Korean War, the United States was
determined to announce a more forceful commitment to Korea
than had existed prior to 1950. As a consequence, the
United States entered into a mutual defense treaty with
Korea which was signed on October 1, 1953. As a result of
this treaty, the United States has rendered enormous amounts
of aid to Korea. Not only has direct military assistance
been granted, but large sums of Supporting Assistance has
been extended to Korea.
After the Nationalist Government of China was forced
from continental Asia, the United States extended aid to the
government under various ad hoc programs . But because of
the lessons learned as a result of the Korean War, the
United States elected to make a firmer treaty commitment to
the Republic of China. Therefore, on December 2, 1954, a
mutual defense alliance was concluded between these two coun-
tries. Since the conclusion of this treaty, the United
States has extended considerable amounts of military aid
which has helped create an effective Chinese military estab-
lishment
.
With each of these multilateral and bilateral mutual
defense alliances, the United States tacitly undertook
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obligations to assist the signatory states with military-
assistance. The aid varied in quantity from massive aid to
NATO members to a minute amount of grant aid to ANZUS members.
In return, the United States received agreements for coopera-
tion in the event of hostilities and other concessions such
as base rights. The mutual assistance obligations incurred
by these agreements varied from the vague requirement to act
together to meet common danger in event of aggression within
certain areas, to the more comprehensive agreement which
considered that an armed attack against one member state
would be considered as an armed attack against all the mem-
ber states and which would result in the use of armed force
to defend the aggrieved nation.
With these alliances, the United States built a wall
of containment around the Sino-Soviet heartland. Member
states stretched from Norway in Europe eastward through the
Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and to Korea and




I MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE ACT OP 19^9
In Chapters II and III, several legislative acts re-
lating to military assistance have been mentioned. In these
early programs the aid had been granted on an essentially
ad hoc basis with little correlation between the needs of
the recipients and overall American national security
strategy and foreign policy. Then, the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of October 19^9 consolidated all the previous
military aid programs and developed a new administrative
plan for world-wide aid. This act became the core of all
future military assistance programs and provided the basic
rationale of long-term mutual defense agreements.
After two years of operation, the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program was found to have a basic weakness. It
became apparent that the separation of military, economic,
and technical assistance in separate uncoordinated programs
was inefficient. It is difficult under many circumstances
to draw a clear distinction between economic and military
projects. A rifle is clearly military aid, and a food
processing plant is essentially economic aid. But a high-
way program can serve both goals: it can assist in the eco-
nomic development of a recipient state and at the same time
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add to the strategic and tactical mobility of the state's
military forces. Consequently, a new program was devised
which would bring all types of assistance— economic , tech-
nical, and military- -into the same legislative package and
thereby help prevent duplication and competition between the
various agencies administering different kinds of aid. The
result was the Mutual Security Act of 1951.
II MUTUAL SECURITY ACTS OF 1951 AND 1954
On October 26, 1951., the Congress passed a new law
which was designed to integrate more effectively the grant-
ing of foreign assistance with broad American foreign policy
objectives. This act was the Mutual Defense Assistance
Control Act of 1951* commonly known as the Battle Act. The
purpose of the Battle Act was to put an embargo on the ship-
ment of all armaments and strategic war materiels to any
nation which may threaten the security of the United States
or its allies. Furthermore, and of particular importance to
this study, it prohibited the granting of American aid to
any recipient state which traded in such commodities with
states who were a potential threat to American security. The
aim of the Act was to halt any trade in arms or strategic
materiels with the Soviet bloc and prohibit any American aid
recipient state from similar trade. There were special pro-
visions enabling the President to allow aid to certain states
which dealt with the Soviet bloc in quasi-strategic
Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 427.
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mater iels, but the Act put the responsibility on the Presi-
dent to justify such action to the Congress. These excep-
tions were designed to permit aid to certain states which
were intimately and economically tied to the Soviet Union, in
hope of slowly weaning them from the complete domination of
Russia. The Battle Act has been a most effective tool of
American foreign policy for it has enabled the United States
to have an influential role in the -trade and foreign policy
conduct of aid-recipient states. It has forced these coun-
tries to take a stand on their world alignment --they must
choose between close association with the United States,
close association with the Communist bloc, or strict mili-
tary neutrality.
The Mutual Security Acts of 1952 and 1953 were essen-
tially the same laws as the 1951 Act, but in 1954 a new and
significant amendment was enacted. It modified the domestic
administration of the Mutual Security Acts and transferred
more of the responsibility for management of the program
from independent agencies to the Departments of State and
Defense. The basic Mutual Security Program, as established
by the Mutual Security Acts, thereafter continued for nearly
a decade without significant change.
Ill THE DRAPER REPORT
Although the Mutual Defense Assistance Acts provided
for better coordination of aid than the previous ad hoc
programs, there was still a continuing criticism of the
foreign aid policy in the press and among certain members of
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the Congress. Therefore, in order to obtain a new and
objective evaluation of the entire foreign aid program,
President Eisenhower ordered a study- in-depth of military
aid in November 1958. He called upon a distinguished group
of men to make a thorough review of the program. William H.
2
Draper, Jr., became chairman of the committee which came to
bear his name and the findings of the committee became known
'as the Draper Report.
3
The composition of the Draper Committee was notable
because of the high calibre and wide experience of its mem-
bers in the fields of law, banking, diplomacy, government,
and war. The devotion and attention to their task is
demonstrated by the fact that the Committee required nearly
a year to complete its study, and the final composite report
numbered some 550 pages.
2
The other members were: Dillon Anderson, Joseph M.
Dodge, Alfred M. Greunther, Marx Leva, John J. McCloy,
George McGhee, Joseph T. McNarney, Arthur W. Radford, and
James E. Webb.
3The several interim and final reports have been
published in two volumes: Draper Committee, Composite
Report of The President 's Committee To Study the United
States "Military Assistance Program, "2~~vol.
,
(Washington,
D.U.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 17, 1959).




The members included three attorneys, five indus-
trialists and business executives, three diplomats, and
four retired general officers. A brief biographical back-




Two broad conclusions of the Committee are of particu-
lar importance. It found that "the Mutual Security Program is
a sound concept and an essential tool of our foreign and
strategic policies.' Furthermore., in response to the Presi-
dent's request to make a "critical appraisal ... of the
relative emphasis which should be given to military and eco-
nomic programs" of foreign assistance, the Committee con-
cluded that "Economic assistance, by strengthening the local
economy /of recipient states^ permits it to bear a heavier
military burden and increases the incentive to the countries'
people to sustain a military effort. . . . Nor does the
maintenance of military strength in a less developed country,
particularly when we cushion its impact with Defense Support,
necessarily inhibit its economic progress." Consequently,
in broad terms the Committee concluded that military assistance
is not only desirable to the United States but absolutely
essential; and that economic assistance, notably today's
Supporting Assistance, is a necessary concomitant to mili-
tary aid.
But in spite of general approval of the Mutual
Security Program, The Draper Committee did find weaknesses
and faults in the program and made many recommendations for
improvement. The most important financial suggestion was
that the dollar levels of all aid should not only be
5Draper Report, vol. I, p. 129.
Ibid




maintained but actually increased. The Committee recommended
an increase of $400 million above the $1.6 billion requested
o
by the Administration for fiscal year i960. For in the
words of the Committee:
... we recommend that four hundred million dollars
more than you had requested for Fiscal Year i960 be
made available for military assistance to avoid the
drastic decline in worldwide deliveries of weapons
and equipment to our allies that would otherwise take
place.
. . .
The military forces which we have helped build
cannot be sustained except on a solid foundation
of annual support of this magnitude. If we do not
commit ourselves to, and follow through with, an
adequate annual support level, the forces which
every responsible national and free world estimate
shows to be required will not exist. In fact, the
recent progress toward meeting necessary levels of
military strength will turn into a decline.
9
In addition, the Committee made important recommenda-
tions for improving the legislation, administration, and
management of military assistance. The more significant
ones are worthy of mention.
1. Department of State influence in the coordination
of military and economic aid should be increased to provide
clearer foreign policy objectives.-1-
2. "A continuing authorization should be provided for
military assistance, and the appropriation should be included












3. The administrative machinery of foreign aid should
be reorganized. The six agencies presently administering
12
foreign aid should be reduced to two. A new agency should
be responsible for all economic aid, and the Department of
Defense should be clearly responsible for military
1-3
assistance. J
4. The Unified Commanders and the country teams
should have greater responsibility for the planning and
execution of all assistance programs. 4
5. Systems of self-evaluat ion and internal audit of
the military and economic aid programs should be estab-
lished. 15
6. Continuing appropriations for military assistance
should be established and be included in the Department of
Defense budget.
7. It is not necessary that individual foreign
assistance programs must b e continued indefinitely. They
12Export- Import Bank, Development Loan Fund, Interna-
tional Cooperation Administration, Agricultural Surplus
Program, International Educational Exchange Service, Depart-
ment of Defense. For an organizational chart of the foreign
aid agencies as studied by the Committee, see the Draper









should be constantly evaluated and when recipient nations no
longer require them, they can be decreased and ended. There
has been a tendency to make some of the programs self-per-
17petuating.
8. Foreign aid must not be continually and exclu-
sively supported by United States funds. Increased partici-
pation in both economic and military assistance should be
sought from our industrially developed allies and other
world inst itutions .-*•
9. Greater emphasis should be placed on mutual
development and standardization of weapons systems with
America's industrially developed allies. Sole reliance on
United States systems will inhibit friendly foreign coun-
tries from enhancing their own military capabilities. -^
10. Some of the requirements to be met by recipient
countries must be liberalized. The stigma of colonial con-
trol is still fresh in the minds of some emerging nations,
and some of the requirements attached to our foreign aid
programs tend to make these nations regard American aid
criteria as unjustified intrusions in the domestic affairs
of the recipient states. Furthermore, some states within
the Soviet orbit presently cannot meet United States aid
requirements, but if the restrictions were liberalized, it










11. "There is no single aspect of the Military
Assistance Irogram which produces more useful returns for the
dollars expended than these /Military Assistance Training/7'
programs. At present, the full potential of this training
has not been realized because of legislative restrictions.
New legislation should permit greater employment of training
21
in military assistance plans."
12. Recipient nations ' military forces should be
utilized to a greater extent in civic action projects, e.g.,
public works, indigenous technical training and education,
etc. This greater emphasis on civic action should be en-
couraged by means of military assistance requirements and
should be limited only when civic action programs are used as
an excuse to maintain military forces larger than actually
needed, and when civic action programs detract from the
22
essential military missions of the armed forces.
13. The Executive Branch should endeavor to inform
the American public about the value and necessity of foreign
assistance. The failure of Americans to see the tangible
results of foreign aid results in pressure on Congress to










should promptly and vigorously answer unjustified and errone-
23
ous reports about the Military Assistance Program.
This study by the Draper Committee was not the first
on the subject of military assistance— during the 1950's
24
there were fifteen major investigations --but it was the
most comprehensive, scholarly, and definitive. Not all the
recommendations of the Committee have been incorporated in
subsequent legislation, and two of the most important have
not been enacted. The Congress has still failed to
appropriate funds near the level of $2 billion as recommended
by the Committee. For fiscal 1965* only $1.05 billion was
voted by the Congress, and the highest figure appropriated
in any year since the Draper Report was $1.8 billion in
25fiscal I96I. The continual refusal of Congress in recent
years to approve of military assistance funds approaching
the $2 billion figure has finally driven the Executive Branch
to request monies closer to the amount that the Congress is
wont to grant. For fiscal 1966, the Administration has pared





Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defense of
Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1900, p. 4T.
25
"
Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts
,
p. 8. This thirty- one page unclassified pamphlet is an
excellent source of selected statistics on military
assistance and its yearly trends.
26Bureau of the Budget, Proposed Mutual Defense and
Development Programs FY 1966, op. cit., p~ FJ5.

61
still not seen fit to Include military assistance in the
Department of Defense budget.
Notwithstanding these failures, the Draper Report had
such an impact on the Executive and Legislative Branches
that many of its recommendations have been accepted in sub-
stance and incorporated in later laws. The most obvious
result of the Report was that it resulted in a new Con-
gressional act--the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This
Act, as amended, is still the current law for foreign aid.
In order to fully understand the operation of military
assistance today and its influence on national security
strategy and foreign policy, it is necessary to make a
detailed examination of the law.
IV SUMMARY
In order to formulate a more coordinated program of
military assistance than was possible under the early ad hoc
aid programs, and to provide for the support commitments
which the multilateral and bilateral mutual defense alliances
required, the United States Congress enacted a comprehensive
aid law. It was the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.
This Act was followed by the generally similar Mutual De-
fense Security Acts of 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1954. Although
these laws continually provided for increased efficiency of.
the foreign aid program, criticism of the program continued.
As a result, President Eisenhower created a study group in
1958 to review the entire military assistance program. This
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group was chaired by William H. Draper, and the Committee and
its report came to bear his name.
The Draper study was an extensive and searching probe
of military assistance. In general, it found the program to
be an essential and effective tool of American national
strategy, and strongly recommended not only its continuance
but also its enlargement. Yet, the Committee did find
grounds for criticism and made many specific recommendations
for improved administration and management.
The significance of the Draper Report was that it was
a solid endorsement of the military assistance program and
that its recommendations for improved management led to new
foreign aid legislation. •

CHAPTER VI
THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF I96I
I FORMAT
1
The Foreign Assistance Act, as currently amended, is
organized into three basic parts. Part I deals with eco-
nomic assistance and describes, among other programs, the
functions and goals of the Contingency Fund and Supporting
Assistance. These two programs, although budgeted and
administered as economic assistance, actually have a close
relationship to military assistance and complement the
Military Assistance Program. Supporting Assistance and the
Contingency Fund will be discussed in greater detail below.
Part II of the Act deals specifically with military assist-
ance. This Part will be analyzed in detail in the remainder
of this chapter. Part III of the Foreign Assistance Act sets
Public Law 87-195 /S. 19837. 75 Stat. 424, approved
September 4, 1961, as amencTed by The Foreign Assistance Act
of 1962, Public Law 87-565 /S. 29967, 76 Stat. 255, approved
August 1, 1962; Public Law "57-793 7&. R. 79277, 76 Stat.
832, approved October 11, 1962; Public Law 88-205 /H. R.
78857, 77 Stat. 379, approved December 16, 1963; Public Law
88-^26 /H. R. 110497, 78 Stat. 400, approved August 14,
1964; Public Law 88-448 /h. R. 738l7 78 Stat. 484, approved
August 19, 1964; Public Law 88-633 /H. R. II3807, 78 Stat. •
1009, approved October 7, 1964; and~~Public Law 88-638
/S. 26877, 78 Stat. 1035, approved October 8, 1964. Herein-
after, T5nis act, as amended will be denoted in footnotes as
the F.A.A. The complete text of the Foreign Assistance Act,
as currently amended, is contained in Informat ion and
Guidance on Military Assistance, op. cit
. , pp. 5T-71.
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forth administrative procedures for the granting of both
economic and military assistance and describes in great de-
tail the criteria and restrictions which must be applied to
the granting of aid.
II PURPOSE
The intent of Congress in enacting the Military
Assistance Program and the basic rationale of military aid,
is contained in the Statement of Policy appearing in the
2beginning of Part II. In describing the purpose of the
Act, the Congress takes particular cognizance of the peace-
ful intentions of the United States in granting military
assistance, noting specifically that the United States will
continue to adhere to the principles contained in the Charter
of the United Nations; will strive for universal control of
nuclear weapons; and will grant military aid solely for pur-
poses of individual and collective self-defense. The Act
also notes that the United States has undertaken these
obligations of mutual aid because international communism
has continually threatened free and independent peoples by
means of military threats and actions, economic pressures,
and internal subversions.
In order to implement this policy of Congress, the






... to furnish military assistance on such terms
and conditions as he may determine,, to any friendly
country or international organizat ion, the assisting
of which the President finds will strengthen the
security of the United States and promote world
peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive
such assistance, by--
(a) acquiring from any source and providing
(by loan, lease, sale, exchange, grant, or any
other means) any defense article or defense
service;
(b) making financial contributions to multi-
lateral programs for the acquisition or construc-
tion of facilities in foreign countries for
collective defense;
(c) providing financial assistance for
expenses incident to participation by the
United States Government in regional or collec-
tive defense organizations; and
(d) assigning or detailing members of the Armed
Forces and other personnel of the Department of
Defense to perform duties of a none ombat ant
nature, including those related to training or
advice.
3
But the President does not have a complete freedom in
the dissemination of aid; he must comply with the rigorous
eligibility requirements which are enumerated in the Act.
These restrictions have a vital bearing on the manner in
which the President shapes national security and diplomacy
by means of military assistance.
Ill ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
Prior to granting military assistance, the President
is obliged to determine the purposes for which the aid is to




military assistance shall be furnished solely for internal
security, legitimate self-defense, and for participation in
regional or collective measures consistent with the Charter
of the United Nations. When aid is granted to underdeveloped
nations, the President must encourage the recipients to
utilize their military forces for Civic Action programs and
other purposes designed to enhance the economic development
of the state.
The use of granted articles is restricted to a re-
cipient's agents, may not be disposed of by any agent of the
recipient state, and may be used only for purposes for which
furnished. The recipient must agree to maintain security of
the articles under the same standards as the United States
maintains. The recipient state must agree to allow continu-
ous inspection of all articles in order to insure their
proper use and security. Also, the articles must be re-
turned to the United States, or disposed of according to
American instructions, when they are no longer required.
Furthermore, no articles may be granted by the Presi-
dent to any country in excess of $3 million per fiscal year
unless: the recipient conforms to the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations; the articles will be used
solely for purposes of defending the recipient and the
United States; and the recipient is making every reasonable





Finally, the Act requires the President to reduce
military aid to a recipient as its own ability to support its
defense increases, and he must terminate assistance if a
recipient uses granted articles "in substantial violation"
5
of any provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act.
Upon examination of only sections 505 and 506 of the
Foreign Assistance Act, it can be seen how extensive the
President's power may be over a recipient country if that
country desires to receive American assistance. The Presi-
dent must require the recipient state to employ the provided
defense articles solely for legitimate self-defense and
internal security. Consequently, the President may bring
pressure to bear upon a recipient state by threatening, or
actually ceasing, military assistance if he determines that
the recipient is using the military assistance articles for
aggressive warfare. The most notable example of this result-
ing influence on a recipient is the case of Pakistan when
that country initiated hostilities against India in 1965.
President Johnson, in attempting to induce Pakistan to cease
the undeclared war, actually did halt military shipments to
Pakistan. The vast majority of military equipment possessed
by Pakistan was of American origin. Had the war continued,
Pakistan would have required expendable military supplies and
maintenance articles for its heavy equipment. The fact that
these supplies were denied to Pakistan by the President can





the decision of Pakistan to agree to end the conflict. Thus,
military assistance served as a valuable tool of American
diplomacy.
In part (b) of Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance
Act, the President is enjoined to encourage recipient states
to employ their military forces in building economic develop-
ment programs. In recent years, a great deal of emphasis
has been placed on this type of program- -known as Civic
Action--and it has had encouraging success in a number of
underdeveloped recipient states. By making the initiation
of Civic Action programs a necessary requirement for con-
tinued military assistance, the President may be able to
induce a recipient state to introduce far-reaching social
and economic development programs.
Section 506 also empowers the President to use mili-
tary assistance as a lever of influence in the internal
sovereignty and foreign policy of recipients. The grantee
is required to use military assistance articles only for
the purposes for which they were granted, i.e., for self-
defense by unilateral or regional action. As a result of
this requirement, the United States has continually pro-
hibited the Portuguese from using American military assist-
ance articles to enforce the repressive measures which the
Portuguese occasionally employ in Angola and Mozambique.
Because the United States reserves the right to make
continuous inspections of the equipment granted by military
assistance, and because the United States demands that re-
cipients maintain certain standards of maintenance of
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provided defense articles, the United States is able to inter-
pose considerable influence on the recipient's security plans
and preparations. Because the American Government is able
to inspect the recipient's military establishments, the
United States can make accurate intelligence estimates of the
capabilities and plans of the recipient state. This mere
knowledge, by the United States, may create an inhibiting
effect on the foreign policy of a recipient state in addi-
tion to impinging to a degree on the sovereignty of the
grantee. Thus, again, the United States may use military
assistance as a method of influencing recipient states.
In addition to these requirements which are imposed
upon recipients, the Congress has charged the President with
the responsibility of decreasing military aid as the ability
of the recipient to finance its own military forces increases
Although the incident arose in response to American economic
aid policies, an interesting example of the diplomatic ef-
fect of this requirement occurred in early 1966 in respect
to Iran. As reported in a Time magazine article, Iran has
recently enjoyed an enormous economic growth as a result of
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi's new economic programs which
have been in effect since 1962. But a not insignificant
element of this Iranian development has been the economic
assistance of the United States. As Time has reported the
situation:
"Iran--The White Revolution," Time , Vol. 87, No. 6,
February 11, 1966, p. 80.

70
Such has been the progress of the Shah's program
that the U.S. Government slashed aid to Iran from
$22 million to $2, 900., 000 last year. And, last
December, President Johnson's Cabinet Committee
on Balance of Payments --which sets guidelines
for the 'voluntary' program limiting direct U.S.
investment abroad—declared that Iran was now a
'developed nation.' Far from feeling compli-
mented, the Shah and Amir Abass Hoveida, his
Prime Minister and chief economic planner, took
the declaration as an affront; it made Iran for
the first time subject to the guidelines.
Although this particular incident is not directly
related to military assistance, it does portend problems
which may arise when the United States will be obliged to
call on certain recipients to share a greater load of their
defense burden. But more important, it indicates how sensi-
tive recipients have become to any cut-back in aid, with the
result that the President may use the threat of a cut-back to
induce recipients to comply with actions which are in the
American national interest.
MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA
The Congress has been particularly sensitive about
military aid to Latin America and consequently has imposed
specific restrictions on the President's freedom to grant
aid to those countries
:
(a) The value of grant programs of defense articles
for American Republics pursuant to any authority
contained in this part other than section 507
/pertaining to sales of military equipment"/, in
any fiscal year beginning with the fiscal~year 1962,
shall not exceed $55,000,000, of which a part may be
used during each fiscal year for assistance in im-
plementing a feasible plan for regional defense . . .
(b) Internal security requirements shall not, unless
the President determines otherwise and promptly re-
ports such determination to the Senate Committee on
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Foreign Relations and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, be the basis for military
assistance programs for American Republics.
7
The purpose of this restriction is quite clear. The
Congress has been concerned about several problems relating
to the Latin American Republics, The first is the predi-
lection of the Latin American military elite to establish
authoritative regimes and military dictatorships. A sine
qua non of these undemocratic regimes is the support of the
military establishment. Consequently, the Congress is loath'
to assist in the creation of military forces in these coun-
tries whose purpose is to support undemocratic governments
o
rather than oppose aggression from outside the hemisphere.
In order to inhibit the growth of military forces beyond that
which is necessary or desirable for likely mutual defense
needs, the Congress has limited the President's freedom to
grant military aid to Latin American states.
Another consideration concerning aid for Latin
American military forces is the American goal of insuring
that Latin states do not use their military capabilities to
engage in wars among themselves. The South American
7
'P. A. A., Sec. 511.
8
A frequent criticism of military assistance to Latin
America is that it has contributed to military coups, re-
sulting in the establishment of military dictatorships and
the demise of democratic institutions. Harold A. Hovey has
made a study of this charge and has concluded that "the
weight of evidence appears to be that military assistance
has not 'caused 1 military coups in Latin America." Harold A.
Hovey, United States Military Assistance (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger , lyb^j, p. '(2.
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Republics have enjoyed comparatively good relations in the
recent decades,, and the Congress is anxious that disagree-
ments arising between Latin states are not resolved by a
resort to arms. As a result, the Congress has intended to
avoid creating such strong military forces in Latin America
that those states would be tempted to test their military
capabilities against their sister republics.
Several other factors have also been considered in
restricting Latin American military assistance. The Congress
has designed aid to Latin America in such a manner as to
prevent one state from gaining an overwhelming military
superiority within the continent. If one state were able
to develop such a capacity, it would possibly enable that
state to gain hegemony over all its sister republics; would
definitely upset the balance of power existing in South
America; and would probably result in an arms race between
the several Latin countries. .If an arms race did begin, some
Latin states might resort to extra-American sources for
the purchase and grant of military articles. This would not
be in the American national interest because the United States
does not desire an arms race among American states, and also
it would be contrary to American interests to have non-
American states supply weapons to South America and there-
by gain political and military influence in this hemisphere.
In order to prevent such conditions from occurring within
the South American states, the United States has designed its
military aid program to Latin America to prevent one state
from gaining a distinctly superior military posture advantage
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over the others and to maintain relative equality between
the several Latin military establishments. A final reason
for the American interest in maintaining relatively modest,
balanced military forces in Latin America is to prevent an
arms race which would have a deleterious effect on the
economic growth of South America. Economic development of
Latin America is a most critical problem affecting not only
the Latin American states themselves, but United States
national interests and world order as well. The attempt by
the Latin states to create military establishments which
would tax the economic and financial resources of these
states could only result in a decrease of these states
'
ability to improve their economic development. Thus, the
Congress, in considering all these factors, has restricted
quite rigidly the freedom of the President to grant military
assistance to Latin America. In turn, these restrictions
have a profound effect on the ability of the United States
to influence Latin American states and hence is another
example of how military assistance supports American foreign
policy.
MILITARY AID TO AFRICA
The Congress has also limited the President's power
to extend grant military assistance to Africa, and the
reasons are similar to those motivating restrictions on Latin
American aid, namely: to prevent one African state from
gaining hegemony over the continent; to prevent an arms race
between the African states which would create an arena for
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East-West competition; to prevent an arms race in Africa
which may lead to a balance of power struggle and resulting
war; to deter the African states from wasting their vital eco-
nomic and financial resources in building large and unneces-
sary military organizations; and to deter African opportun-
ists from employing military establishments in overthrowing
those democratic governments which do exist in Africa.
Consequent ly, the Congress has written into the foreign aid
law specific restrictions on military aid to Africa:
No military assistance shall be furnished on a
grant basis to any country in Africa, except for
internal security requirements or for programs
described in section 505(b) of this chapter
/pertaining to Civic Action Programs/''., unless the
"President determines otherwise and promptly reports
such determination to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. The value of grant
programs of defense articles for African coun-
tries . . . shall not exceed $25,000,000 /per
fiscal year_7.9
RESTRICTIONS ON AID TO COMMUNIST STATES
The general rule regarding aid to Communist states is
found in Part Three of the Foreign Assistance Act and per-
tains to economic aid as well as military assistance: "No
assistance shall be furnished under this Act to the govern-
ment of any country unless the President determines that
such country is not dominated or controlled by the inter-
national Communist movement." But, if the President does
Q
F.A.A., Sec. 512. For a lengthier discussion of aid
to Africa, see: Hovey, _op. cit






consider that it is in the American interest to grant aid to
a state with a Communist government, he is obliged to advise
Congress of the fact and clearly indicate to the Congress
that the grant is vital to the security of the United States.
Also, he must show that the recipient state is not con-
trolled by the "international Communist conspiracy," and that
the assistance will promote the independence of the recipient
country from "international Communism."
Thus, it can be seen that there are loopholes in the
law which do permit the President to extend assistance to
Communist states, and in fact it has been done in the past,
prior to the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
with dramatic results.
Following World War II, the Soviets were unable to
occupy Yugoslavia as completely as they did the other
Eastern European states. This was due partly to Soviet mili-
tary strategy which did not require large Red Army forces to
move into Yugoslav territory, and partly because Tito had
already established a viable and de facto government which
had the support of a well-equipped and loyal army. As a
result of these conditions, Tito was able to chart a more
11
F.A.A., Sec. 620(f). The F.A.A. does not define
the "international Communist conspiracy" or "movement," but
it does specifically name in Sec. 620(f), each of the fol-
lowing states as a "Communist country": Peoples Republic of
Albania, Peoples Republic of Bulgaria, Peoples Republic of
China, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, German Democratic
Republic (East Germany), Estonia, Hungarian Peoples Republic,
Latvia, Lithuania, North Korean Peoples Republic, North Viet-
nam, Outer Mongolia-Mongolian Peoples Republic, Polish
Peoples Republic, Rumanian Peoples Republic, Tibet, Federal




independent course in the immediate postwar period than the
neighboring Balkan regimes were able to do. By June 1948,
Tito openly renounced his acquiescence to Soviet domination.
Although this policy was dangerous because it risked Soviet
military attack, Tito was able to operate from a significant
position of strength because of his thorough control of
Yugoslavia, and because of support he received from the
West. The NATO states were quick to realize that a diplo-
matic and strategic coup would result by supporting Tito
against Stalin and Soviet hegemony. Consequently, Tito's
request for Western support was fruitful. He received $20
million in credits from the Export-Import Bank and some $40
1 P
million in food supplies. So effective was this economic
support in enabling Tito to oppose Stalin's attempted domina-
tion, that in 1951 the United States began to grant military
assistance to Yugoslavia in order that Tito could completely
sever his Soviet relations. Also, aid was extended to
Tito for assisting Yugoslav industrialization. As a result,
Tito became so independent that in October 1951 he was able
to declare "that, if Russian aggression caused a third world
..nil
war, Yugoslavia would fight on the side of the West.
Tito further indicated his independence from Moscow by
Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations Of Nations






entering, in 195^- 3 a "Little Balkan Entente" with Greece and
Turkey, both NATO members. Thereafter, Yugoslavia became a
nominal partner in Western defense strategy against the
Soviets
.
Although subsequent amendments to American foreign
aid laws ostensibly prohibit aid to Yugoslavia, exceptions
to this prohibition can be made by the President, and it
can be logically assumed that the United States would again
extend economic and military aid to Yugoslavia if it be-
comes necessary in order for Tito to maintain his inde-
pendence. Although Yugoslavia still remains a Communist
state, it is a politically independent one which is defi-
nitely outside the Soviet orbit and, by default, a NATO
ally. The Yugoslav case is a significant example of the
value of American economic and military assistance in fur-
thering the national interests of the United States.
RESTRICTIONS ON AID TO CUBA
Not only does the Foreign Assistance Act specifically
prohibit the granting of assistance to Cuba, but it also
restricts American aid to third states which engage in
aiding Cuba--unless the President determines it to be in
the national interest to do so. The provisions relating to
third states forbids assistance to these states unless they
halt ships of their registry from transporting to Cuba any
items of economic assistance of strategic articles as de-
fined by the Battle Act. Finally, the Act also permits the
President to establish a complete embargo on all trade
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between the United States and Cuba. All these restrictions
apply as long as the Castro regime remains in power. ->
Here we find an important device which may be used
i
by the President. Although Section 620 of the Act is aimed
primarily at a quarantine of Cuban commerce,, it also enables
the President to halt American assistance to states con-
ducting certain trade relations with Cuba. Thus,, if it
eventually serves the national interest of the United States
to halt assistance to states dealing with Cuba, the President
has the legislative authorization to do so. Thus far, the
President has been most reluctant to apply sanctions to
recipient states which trade with Cuba, but the threat is
real and the onus has been put on several nations to justify
their Cuban trade. One notable case involved a British-
Cuban trade arrangement. In 1964 , a private British con-
cern, Leyland Motor Co., entered into a trade agreement to
supply 950 buses to Cuba. Although the British Government
did not directly negotiate the deal, they did feel obliged
to make announcements justifying the trade on the grounds
that the buses could not directly contribute to the military
posture of Cuba. The British Government did, however, in-
sure that the buses were not transported in British registry
ships, thus giving at least a recognition to the American






Although the more affluent of the United States
'
allies could be less deterred from Cuban trade because they
receive less assistance from the United States, many of the
underdeveloped nations, notably Latin American, are sensitive
to this American prohibition on Cuban trade and have been
prone to cooperate with the United States. Here then is
another example of how American foreign assistance, admit-
tedly in this case primarily economic assistance, can exert
strong influence on recipient states.
MISCELLANEOUS RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN AID
There are other provisions in the Foreign Assistance
Act which the President must observe which may be employed
as an instrument of foreign policy. The President is re-
quired to halt any assistance to a recipient if that state:
(a) nationalizes any property which is at least half owned
by Americans; (b) has repudiated existing contracts or
agreements negotiated with firms which are more than half
American- owned; or (3) has imposed discriminatory taxes
against American firms which amount to expropriation. These
Congressional restrictions may be removed if a recipient
takes appropriate action, within a reasonable time, to
adequately compensate American firms for losses resulting
from actions as described above. In addition, the Presi-
dent must require that each state, which is underdeveloped,
agree to enter into an investment guarantee program which
F.A.A., Sec. 620 (e).

80
insures in advance against expropriation or confiscation of
American property. This requirement also includes loss
17
against risks of currency incontrovertability.
These requirements which are applied to recipients
are designed primarily to protect private American invest-
ments in developing nations. It has frequently been the
experience of American corporations that foreign states
resort to an expediency of confiscating American property
and funds when they are unable to efficiently manage their
economies , or when a chauvinistic and xenophobic wave of
nationalism prompts the takeover of United States assets.
The most notable example of mass expropriation in recent
years occurred after Castro gained power in Cuba. But
other cases, less onerous but still serious, have occurred.
Certain Latin states have within recent years applied ex-
cessive taxes on American extractive corporations which, in
practice, amounted to partial expropriation. Also, American
oil companies have experienced contract renegotiations,
demanded by Middle Eastern countries, which have resulted in
such sharp cuts in profits that the American companies were
forced to consider abandoning their operations. Such con-
duct by foreign states not only causes immediate distress
to American companies, but it also constitutes myopic poli-
cies by these states because they severely discourage the
flow of investment capital into their economies. It is
hardly profitable, for either the United States or a
17F.A.A., Sec. 620 (1).
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developing state, to arrange foreign aid programs and at
the same time deter private investment. Consequent ly, the
United States has undertaken the policy of tying American
assistance to investment guarantees which must be made by
the recipients. Admittedly, this provision is designed
primarily to relate to economic aid, but the United States
may also threaten to halt military assistance in order to
enforce investment guarantees.
A secondary advantage accruing to the United States
as a result of enforcing this provision of the Act is that
it will force recipient states to make more feasible and
rational economic policies. One of the primary goals of
American foreign policy is to assist underdeveloped states
improve their economies and industrialization. Because
recipient states are aware of the consequences of ex-
propriation, the United States has a tool which may be used
not only to protect American investments, but to insure
logical economic planning in the future on the part of
recipient countries.
In final addition to these several restrictions placed
upon the President, one more is germane to this study. This
one prohibits aid to any state which is preparing for
aggressive military action against the United States or any
-i o
state receiving American aid. The real importance of this
restriction is not because it prohibits aid to a state which
has plans for aggression against the United States. It is
l8F.A.A., Sec. 620 (i).
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axiomatic that no state would knowingly assist another
country which has intentions to attack its benefactor. The
real significance of this provision is that it prohibits aid
to a state which may be planning, or does commit, aggression
against a third state which is also an American assistance
recipient. Thus, the restriction is designed to protect
American mutual security allies from attacking each other.
There have been instances in the past " when two states
receiving American aid have either engaged in hostilities
or have been close to an actual war. These crises have
certainly not been sanctioned by the United States, nor have
they been in the American national interest. Also, it must
be agreed that when a really vital issue confronts two or
more American aid-recipient countries, the threat of a loss
of American aid will not, per se, deter warfare. The loss
of American aid cannot ultimately stop such a war because
vital interests by definition imply a resort to war. Also,
if a state is determined to fight, it can frequently find
alternate sources of weapons--at least for a short war.
Notwithstanding these considerations, it must be con-
cluded that the threatened loss of American assistance can
help deter war in less than vital cases. Greece and Turkey,
in their disagreement over Cyprus, are a case in point. The
only great power that would gain politically from a Greek-
Turkish confrontation would be the Soviet Union. Although
1Q^For example, the Greek-Turkish confrontation over
Cyprus, and the Indo- Pakistan war in Kashmir.
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it is within the realm of possibility that the Turks may at
some future date turn to the Soviets for support, it cer-
tainly would not be practical nor wise for the Turks to do
so in order to obtain assistance for a Cyprus confrontation.
The risk would be too grave for the Turks to turn to their
ancient enemy, and the issue of Cyprus does not quite reach
such a vital extreme. Consequently, the United States
remains in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis these two
states in influencing them to settle their differences with--
out resort to arms
.
t
Other instances may be cited to support this argu-
ment; for example, the Indo- Pakistan Kashmir dispute and
disputes in Latin America. It is, of course, impossible to
assess accurately how effective American pressure to sus-
pend assistance to our friends is, but it must be granted
that in less than vital issues it can be helpful lever of
diplomacy. The awareness on the part of recipient states,
that the President is obliged legally (and politically) to
halt assistance in cases where there are threats of aggres-
sion between American allies, serves two purposes. It
assures each of our allies that the United States endeavors
to protect them from each other, and, in addition, it
serves as a mortar holding together the essential American
alliance system.
IV MILITARY ASSISTANCE SALES
Thus far, this chapter has been addressed to a dis-
cussion of those sections of the Foreign Assistance Act
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which deal with grant,, or gift, aid. In addition, this Act
contains procedures that must be followed in order to sell
defense articles and services to countries and international
organizations which require American military equipment, /
but who do not qualify for grant aid. These cases arise
when a friendly state is in need of modern defense equip-
ment, but is unable to produce it locally, is not able to
manufacture it at prices comparable to American costs, or
is unable to pay for it without the extension of American
governmental credits. The section dealing with Military
Assistance Sales is quite brief, and the restrictions per-
taining to sales are considerably less detailed than those
affecting grant aid. The President is empowered to grant
defense articles to friendly foreign states and interna-
tional organizations providing they agree to pay a fair
price for the articles in dollars and to make advance pay-
ments when necessary to cover development and research
costs. 20
The Military Assistance Sales program is a most
valuable adjunct in the formulation of American national
strategy. The advantages that accrue to the United States
are not only similar to those which result from grant aid,
but in addition they have the extraordinary virtue of
paying for themselves. Also, the requirement to pay for
the sales in dollars assists in alleviating the current





states and ten international and regional organizations are
qualified to make some kind of Military Assistance Sales
21purchases from the United States.
The trend of this sales program is both significant7
and interesting. It is significant because it has been
continuously increasing since 1950 when sales amounted to
22$13 million. In 1964 the total volume of sales reached
an annual volume of $804.4 million, and, in the years from
1950 through 1964, Military Assistance Sales reached a
23grand total of $5.24l billion. The importance of this
trend is that it indicates that America's mutual defense
allies are increasingly able to shoulder a greater part of
the Western Bloc defense costs.
An interesting aspect relating to Military Assistance
Sales is the recent unexpected support the program (and all
21
The sixty-seven countries, essentially comprise
those nations which have concluded multilateral or bi-
lateral mutual defense alliances with the United States.
But several neutral or nonaligned states also qualify, e.g.,
Sweden, Switzerland, and India. The ten international or
regional organizations which qualify to make purchases are:
ANZUS; CENTO; International Civil Aviation Organization;
International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos;
NATO and its agencies: OAS; Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic; SEATO; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers,
Europe; and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organiza-





., p. 129. This figure represents only articles
and does not include services which, were purchased. For the
years 1950 through 1956, accurate accounting figures for
services are not available for individual years, but the




foreign aid) has received from the American private business
community. Whereas in past years , much criticism has been
leveled at the foreign aid program by business interests,
today a number of business leaders are not only supporting
the concept of foreign aid, but have in fact quietly estab-
lished a group in Washington to lobby for foreign aid
appropriations. As reported in Forbes magazine, David E.
Bell, Administrator for the Agency for International
Development, has attributed the rapid Congressional approval'
of the fiscal year 1966 foreign aid appropriation to the
activities of this lobby. The Forbes article deals with
foreign aid, military assistance; and Public Law 240, the
Food For Peace Program. It points out that American
businessmen have only recently become really aware of the
gross revenues which these aid .programs generate for
American industry, shipping companies, and agriculture.
Although this lobby, and businessmen in general, attest to
the fact that foreign aid programs are vital to American
national interests, the discussion clearly indicates that
it has been the opportunity for profits which has finally
brought the value of foreign aid into focus for the business
world :
Most businessmen feel that foreign aid is a neces-
sary and important instrument of U.S. foreign
policy, as important in its way as military strength.
However, the motives of the businessmen are not
entirely unselfish. They're equally concerned
with driving home to Congress two unarguable facts:
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(l) that foreign aid creates jobs for Americans
rather than destroying them; and (2) that it
does not contribute significantly to the U.S.
balance of payments deficit. 24
After commenting of the volume of industrial sales
that aid creates as a result of requiring recipients to
"buy American/' Forbes continues: "In addition, they will
buy $1 billion worth of U.S. military equipment." The
article continues to explain that American aid programs,
including military assistance, are far from the vast "give-
aways" that they are frequently reputed to be. In fact, it
is shown that eighty-five per cent of foreign aid appropria-
tions never leave the United States but are established as
credits for recipient nations to draw upon. Of the re-
maining fifteen per cent, most of it is ultimately used to
purchase American goods
.
Although it is agreed that the American taxpayer
must still pay the cost of aid programs, in many ways
these programs are still vital investments in American
national strategy. They contribute to the military strength
of the states allied with the United States, they create
jobs for Americans, they help dispose of agricultural sur-
pluses by providing food to our underdeveloped allies, they
develop markets for American goods, and they help to create
a higher standard of living in underdeveloped countries
which helps negate the appeal of Communism.
"The Money Never Leaves Home," Forbes , Vol. 95,




The legislation which empowers the President to grant
military assistance is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as currently amended. The intent of the Congress in enacting \
this law is to further the security of the United States
and its allies. While the President is responsible for
administering the aid programs, he is obliged to comply
with the many restrictions which are written into the Act.
These restrictions actually serve as effective tools
of diplomacy because they enable the President to require
that recipient countries perform certain acts in order to
qualify for aid. Examples of these requirements include:
1. That aid is used for self-defense or for mutual
defense as prescribed by the United Nations Charter;
2. That the recipient allow the United States to
determine the ultimate disposition of the military
articles., to maintain continuous observation of the
articles , and to insure that the recipient maintain
satisfactory security of the equipment;
3. That when feasible, grant military equipment be
used for Civic Action Programs in underdeveloped
countries
;
4. That Latin American states use military
assistance only for security against aggression
from without the hemisphere or for internal security
which is Communist inspired or directed;
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5. That recipient states must prove that they are
not controlled by the International Communist Move-
ment ;
6. That recipient states must not engage in trade
with, or grant assistance to, Cuba in items of
strategic value;
7. That recipient states must agree to procedures
which are designed to protect American private in-
vestors in the recipient country; and
8. That recipient states may not engage in or plan
hostile acts against the United States or any other
states which receives American military, economic,
technical, or food assistance.
By means of enforcing these requirements, the Presi-
dent is able to exert significant influence on states which
receive American military assistance.

CHAPTER VII
MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
I INFLUENCE OF THE DRAPER REPORT
The Draper Report resulted in important changes in
the management and planning of military assistance. Of the
many recommendations of the Committee., several had a direct
bearing on management and are presently incorporated into
law and practice. The more significant ones are:
1. Increased Department of State influence on the
coordination of military aid with foreign policy
objectives
.
2. Increased responsibility of the Unified Commanders
and Country Teams in the planning and execution of
programs
.
3. Initiation of internal audits of military
assistance programs.
4. Long-term planning of military assistance
objectives
5. Creation of an office of Assistant Secretary of




For the highlights of the Draper Report, see Chapter
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These recommendations resulted in more efficient
planning of military assistance programs. Particularly
important was the new system of decentralized planning,
whereby programs were reviewed by all levels of the plan-
ning machinery from the President down to the Military
^
Assistance Advisory Groups.
In order to understand more clearly both the planning
and management of military assistance and the specific
responsibilities of the planners involved, it is helpful to
study the process which is employed to develop a new pro-
gram of military assistance. For illustrative purposes,
we will examine a hypothetical case wherein the Republic of
China has requested American aid to replace the aging F-104
aircraft with a more modern weapons system, the F-lll.
II THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLANNING PROCESS
Chinese military planners have determined that their
F-104 aircraft are no longer adequate for the task of de-
fending Taiwan. The obvious choice of an aircraft for
replacement is the new F-lll weapons system. This aircraft
is a versatile weapon which can be used for fighter defense
in antiair warfare, for long-range and high-speed recon-
naissance of the Asiatic mainland, and for conventional
and nuclear strike operations. The Chinese desire to obtain
a squadron of eighteen aircraft and associated support
equipment, spare parts, and personnel training. Further-
more, they desire that the planes be supplied as grant aid.
They therefore make a feasibility study of the employment of
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the F-lll from Taiwan bases and present this study, together
with a formal request for the aircraft , to the American
ambassador
.
Because the Chinese request would constitute a com-
pletely new aid program, and because of the magnitude of
the assistance requested, the American Ambassador elects to
forward the Chinese request directly to the Department of
State. In cases where requests for assistance involve
relatively modest sums of money and in cases of routine
equipment and training requests, the Ambassador may choose
2
to consult with his military advisors in the Country Team
and forward his recommendations not only to the Department
of State, but also through the military chain of command to
the Department of Defense. But because this request has
significant strategic and diplomatic implications, the
Ambassador has sent the request directly to the Department
of State.
When the Secretary of State receives the Chinese re-
quest, he informs the President of it. The President con-
sults with the National Security Council because of the
financial magnitude of the request, the national strategic
The Country Team consists of all American organiza-
tions engaged in official covert government operations
within a foreign state. These organizations include the
diplomatic and consular missions; the United States Informa-
tion Agency; representatives of the several American
federal departments including Agriculture, Commerce, and
Treasury; members of the Agency for International Develop-
ment; and the Military Assistance Advisory Group.
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factors involved., the political implications of granting such
a new weapons system to an ally, and security risks involved
in a possible loss of an aircraft to the Chinese Peoples
Republic. The National Security Council advises the Presi-
dent that , subject to American priorities for the aircraft,
the grant of the F-lll system to the Chinese is compatible
with American national strategy objectives . Consequently,
the President directs the Secretary of State to initiate a
detailed study of the matter.
In Chapter VI, this study described the requirements
written into the Foreign Assistance Act which the Presi-
dent is obliged to fulfill prior to the granting of
foreign aid. In order to insure that this proposed grant
to the Chinese Republic is compatible with the law, the
Secretary of State initiates a .study of the pertinent
requirements. The following determinations are made:
1. The aircraft would be employed solely for
legitimate self-defense under a mutual and collec-
tive security arrangement as sanctioned by the
United Nations Charter;
2. The Chinese feasibility study indicates that
appropriate provisions are guaranteed for the inspec-
tion of the airplanes and their security;
3. The Republic of China is making all reasonable
efforts to enhance its own defense capability, but
it is unable to afford the purchase of the aircraft
and thus is not excluded from receiving this grant;
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4. The Republic of China is not dominated by the
international Communist movement;
5. The Republic of China does not deal with or aid
Cuba;
6. The Republic of China has taken no steps to
hazard American private investments in Taiwan;
7. The Republic of China has no aggressive plans
against the United States or any other states
receiving American foreign assistance.
But, in addition to insuring that these Presidential
obligations are satisfied, the Secretary of State is also
specifically charged by the Foreign Assistance Act with
certain responsibilities regarding foreign aid, namely:
Under the direction of the President, the
Secretary of State shall be responsible for the
continuous supervision and general direction of
the assistance programs authorized by this Act,
including but not limited to determining whether
there shall be a military assistance program for
a country and the value thereof, to the end that such
programs are effectively integrated both at home and
abroad and the foreign policy of the United States
is best served thereby.
3
Upon reviewing the foreign policy objectives as deter-
mined by the President and the National Security Council,
the Secretary of State concludes that the proposed grant is
in consonance with American national interests, and he gives
preliminary approval to the grant.
During this phase of the grant planning, another
executive official enters the planning process. He is the
3F.A„A., Sec 622 (c).
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Inspector General,, Foreign Assistance, who holds his office
by Presidential appointment with the advice and consent of
the Senate. He is charged with two broad responsibilities:
(l) He must conduct audits of aid programs to determine
that they are legal, efficient, and economically adminis-
tered; and (2), he must insure that aid programs are in
consonance with American foreign policy objectives. The
role of the Inspector General is extremely important. Not
only does he insure that the letter and spirit of an aid
program complies with the law, but he also serves as a staff
advisor to all agencies that are involved in the planning
and administration of an aid program. The value of this
service cannot be underestimated. Very frequently, dif-
ferent echelons of a management structure are unable to
maintain an adequate perspective of the end objectives of a
program. The Inspector General and his staff are able to
assist these various echelons in assuring that their plans
and their management operations actually do fit into the
"big picture." In this illustration, the Inspector General
makes a preliminary study of the proposed grant and advises
the Secretary of State that the program is in consonance with
American foreign policy objectives. In addition, he will
continually monitor the program to insure that it is legally
and economically managed.
Once the Secretary of State has determined to study
the feasibility of granting the Chinese request, he also
^F.A.A., Sec. 624 (d).
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advises the Secretary of Defense to make further evaluations.
The Secretary of Defense is charged under the Foreign
Assistance Act with certain duties:
1. The determination of military end-item require-
ments;
2. The procurement of military equipment in a
manner which permits its integration with service
programs
;
3. The supervision of end-item use by the recipient
countries
.
4. The supervision of the training of foreign
military personnel;
5. The movement and delivery of military end- it ems;
6. The performance of any other functions with
respect to the furnishing of military assistance
with the Department of Defense; and
7. The establishment of priorities in the procure-
ment, delivery, and allocation of military equipment.
^
As a result of recommendations offered by the Draper
Committee., there was established, by a Department of Defense
directive, an office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs. This Assistant Secretary
reports directly to the Secretary of Defense, and he is
responsible to him for all aspects of military assistance
program within the Department of Defense. Specifically, he




coordination and establishment of procedures pertaining to
the Military Assistance Program; supervising, administering,
and directing the Military Assistance Program; and planning,
organizing and monitoring the activities of Military
Assistance Advisory Groups." Within his staff, his chief
military advisor is the Director of Military Assistance.
The Director's major responsibility is to insure that
policies generated within the office of the Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs adequately reflect
the policies and needs of the three military departments.
In executing these responsibilities, the Director of Military
Assistance serves in a liaison role, coordinating the mili-
tary planning of aid projects between the three semiautonomous
organizations which exist immediately below the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. These three organizations are the
Office of the Director of Military Assistance, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force.
After studying the Chinese request, both the Assistant
Secretary for International Security Affairs and the Director
of Military Assistance concur that no serious impediments
exist to granting the request, and thus extend their pre-
liminary approval.
Information and Guidance on Military Assistance, p.
11. ?
'Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19bi)), pi. T%l"3£T.

98
At the same time that the Secretary of Defense has
informed his Assistant Secretary of the proposal, he also
forwards the request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order
to determine whether it is compatible with their overall
o
strategic plans. The Joint Chiefs of Staff study the
proposal and evaluate it in the light of several factors
which they must consider. They must insure that the plan
supports their overall military objectives and that it con-
tributes to a balance in the entire Military Assistance
Program. Furthermore, they must determine when it would be
feasible to schedule the transfer of the aircraft in light
of American needs and priorities. Finally, they must deter-
mine whether they can supply the required personnel which
must be provided for the Military Assistance Advisory Group
to supervise the introduction of the F-lll aircraft into the
Chinese Air Force.
Upon consideration of all these parameters, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff conclude that the granting of a squadron of
eighteen F-lll planes to the Chinese would be compatible
with American global strategy, and they give their approval
to the proposed grant. But, they recommend that the air-
craft not be granted until fiscal year 1970 because of
American priorities.
Q
For a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to military assistance,
see: Information and Guidance, op. cit., p. 10.
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During the same time that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense are deliberating the
merits of the Chinese request, the Secretaries of the two
military departments most concerned with F-lll aircraft
also review the proposal. These two are the Department of
the Navy and the Department of the Air Force. They also
have particular responsibilities within the military
assistance planning process.-^ They are responsible for
budget estimates of the proposed grant, direction of the
production plans and schedules of the aircraft manufacturers,
acquisition of spare parts and support equipment for the
aircraft, providing for personnel to man the Military
Assistance Advisory Groups, and the training of the pilots,
flight observers, and maintenance personnel. During their
review of the proposed grant, the Department Secretaries
and their military advisors can also express their objec-
tions to any aspect of the proposal. In this particular
case, both the Department of the Navy and the Department of
the Air Force have voiced their concern about the necessity
of insuring that American service priorities are not com-
promised. After considering all the factors which lie
within their purview, both of the Departments extend their
approval of the proposed grant--but with the reservation
that the aircraft not be provided until fiscal year 1970.
Q
For a detailed account of the responsibilities of
the Military Departments in the planning of military




When the Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs receives the reports from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Navy, and Air Force, he then sends the pro-
posal to the next lower level in the chain of planning.
This level is the Unified Commander, and in this illus-
tration the appropriate Unified Commander is the Commander
in Chief, Pacific
.
At each lower echelon of the planning process, the
examination of the proposal is viewed from a more narrow
perspective. This is exemplified by the more limited con-
siderations of the grant which are made by the Commander in
Chief, Pacific. His primary concern is to insure that a
planned project within his geographic area supports the
broad strategy which he has planned. In addition, he must
insure that a new project supports the geographic balance of
forces which he deems necessary. The secondary concerns of
the Unified Commander relate to his more routine duties. He
must provide for the administration and logistical support
of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups within his area,
and he must be responsible for the scheduling of equipment
transfers, provisions for transportation of aid items, and
all the other ordinary tasks associated with the movement,
introduction, and support of military aid within his geo-
graphic area of command. °
10
Information and Guidance
, op. cit., p. 12, and
Hovey, op. cit., pp. i4l-4t>.
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Upon analysis of the new proposal,, the Commander in
Chief , Pacific , decides that new aircraft for the Republic
of China would add to his military posture in the Pacific.,
and that they would support his strategic plans. He con-
siders that the Chinese Air Force is a most valuable ele-
ment of the Pacific military structure, and that in order
to maintain its capabilities , new aircraft must be pro-
grammed for the Chinese as new technological advances
dictate. Furthermore, he concludes that the deployment of
a squadron of F-lll aircraft on Taiwan would position them
in a most vital area of the American Asiatic defense
perimeter and, in addition, would support American diplo-
matic and strategic credibility by indicating to the
Chinese Peoples Republic that Taiwan is so vital to Ameri-
can interests that the Republic of China's Air Force will
be continually provided with first line aircraft. Addi-
tionally, the Unified Commander determines that there will
be no serious problems involved in supporting the Military
Assistance Advisory Group on Taiwan in their work in intro-
ducing F-lll planes into the Chinese Air Force. As a re-
sult of his evaluations, he directs his Chief, Military
Assistance Advisory Group, to initiate a study to develop
a plan for the introduction of F-lll 's into the Chinese Air
Force
.
The chain of command in the military assistance plan-
ning process is a bilateral one between the President and
the country teams. There is a correlation at the extreme
top of the structure between the President, the National
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Security Council,, and the Secretaries of State and Defense.
But from this top level, the command structure separates.
Within the military group, it proceeds from the Secretary of
Defense through three "pipelines" to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Assistance Secretary of International Security
Affairs, and the Service Departments. These three "pipe-
lines" maintain a coordination through the Office of the
Director of Military Assistance. But from this level, the
command structure again closes and these three levels all
have a command responsibility over the Unified Commander.
From the Unified Commander, the chain proceeds down to the
Military Assistance Advisory Groups of the Country Teams.
The other chain of this bilateral system, the civilian
and diplomatic one, proceeds directly from the Secretary of
State to the Ambassador, or the' Chief of the diplomatic
mission in the recipient country.
The Ambassador to the Republic of China, as the repre-
sentative of the President, is the senior American official
in Taiwan. In this capacity, he directs the operation of
12
all American organizations, including the Military
11
The duties and responsibilities of the MAAG's are
discussed below.
12
There are certain circumstances when American organi-
zations within a foreign country are able to operate inde-
pendently of the ambassador's direction. The most notable
case exists when American military forces are engaged in
combat operations within the country. Also, there have been
press reports in recent years that ambassadors are fre-
quently not apprised of the operations of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency with the state where they serve. But for
purposes of this illustration, it is assumed that the am-




Assistance Advisory Group. He is responsible solely to the
President and the Secretary of State.
As soon as practical after the Secretary of State
determined to make a detailed study of the proposed grant
to China, he informed the American Ambassador in Taipei
about it. As a result, the Ambassador is able to express
his views on the matter. In fact, the drafters of the
Foreign Assistance Act specifically intended that the am-
bassadors enter into the decision-making process concerned
with military assistance. His duties in this regard are
described in the Act:
The President shall prescribe appropriate
procedures to assure coordination among repre-
sentatives of the United States Government in
each country, under the leadership of the Chief
of the United States Diplomatic Mission. The
Chief of the diplomatic mission shall make sure
that recommendations of such representatives
pertaining to military assistance are coordinated
with political and economic considerations, and
his comments shall accompany such recommendations
if he so desires. 13
Although the Ambassador elected not to comment on the
original Chinese overture and forwarded it unendorsed to
the Secretary of State, he now chooses to advise the
Secretary of his opinions on the granting of the aircraft.
In his report, the Ambassador judges that furnishing a
squadron of F-lll aircraft to the Chinese would have
important advantages for the United States . It would aid
in maintaining the very close diplomatic and military rela-
tions which exist between the United States and the Republic
13F.A.A., Sec. 622 (b).
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of China. It would contribute to the morale of the Chinese
military personnel, because it would demonstrate American
determination to support the Republic of China with the
best military equipment available. It is also the Ambas-
sador's judgment that the grant would contribute to the
creditability of American determination to help protect its
mutual defense allies. This factor is a most important con-
sideration in Asia. Additionally, the Ambassador considers
that the grant would in no way create diplomatic reper-
cussions in any other friendly Asiatic state. All the other
Pacific allies who have the technical experience to operate
the F-lll are also economically able to purchase them rather
than require a grant. And finally, the Ambassador relates
that his military advisors, the military attaches, recommend
the grant because it would materially and effectively con-
tribute to the Allied military posture which supports the
United States containment policy in Asia. In short, the
Ambassador is completely in favor of the grant.
In our description of the coordinated decision-making
process employed in military assistance planning, we have
now arrived at the lowest echelon--the Military Assistance
Advisory Group. This organization is the military component
of the country team and may include members of each of the
three military services. In purely military administrative
affairs and in matters affecting essentially technical de-
tails and operations, the members of the Advisory Group may
communicate directly with their parent military service via
the Unified Commander. But save for these exceptions, and
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in spite of the fact that the Chief of the Advisory Group is
a representative of the Secretary of Defense, he and his
group are still responsible to the Ambassador for all their
operations within Taiwan.
The Military Assistance Advisory Groups , as the name
implies, are stationed in recipient countries to offer
guidance on military matters. They train the indigenous
military personnel in tactics, military organizations, per-
sonnel training, and operation and maintenance of American-
supplied equipment. In addition, the MAAG's are charged
with making military assistance plans and programs in
cooperation with the Ambassador, and with making recommenda-
tions to the Unified Commander concerning military assistance
14
projects. As a result of orders received from the Unified
Commander and directives from the Ambassador, the Chief of
the Advisory Group submits his analysis on the proposed
grant. His review covers essentially technical details.
He reports that he considers that the Chinese Air Force
personnel are well-qualified and competent to operate and
maintain F-lll aircraft with a minimum of special training.
In fact, he is of the opinion that all the personnel train-
ing which will be necessary for the introduction of the
aircraft can be accomplished within Taiwan, thus eliminating-
the requirement to send Chinese personnel to the United
States. In addition, the Chief of the Group judges that the
14
Col. Clyde V. Pickell and Ma j . Thomas C. Musgrove,
"Investment in Security," Military Review , Vol. XI,
December i960, P. 55.
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Chinese Air Force is sufficiently knowledgeable in matters
of strategy and tactics so that they could effectively
utilize the extensive capabilities for which the F-lll has
been designed. Also, the Chief determines that there are
adequate installations in Taiwan to operate a squadron of
F-lll's efficiently. Finally, the Chief has determined, by
means of an independent study, that if the Chinese can re-
ceive eighteen aircraft by means of a grant, they can there-
after satisfactorily afford to operate the planes without
special American financial support. In conclusion, the
Chief of the Advisory Group reports that there are no
impediments to the Chinese capability to operate and support
the F-lll aircraft if they are made available.
We can now see, by means of this illustration, how a
specific aid project may be programmed and how each echelon
of the decision-making structures may become involved, from
the President down to the Amer ?Lc an _ military personnel work-
ing with the recipient countries' military services. Each
level of command has been able to evaluate the project and
make its favorable or unfavorable recommendations. Thus
far, we have seen in this particular demonstration that the
project has received favorable approval. But the process is
still not complete because, although the need and desira-
bility of the grant has been established, the means have
not. The means is Congressional approval, and this is
accomplished by providing the aid money.
Now that nearly all of the elements in the planning
process of military assistance have had an opportunity to

107
evaluate the proposed Chinese grant, their appraisal reports
of it begin to flow in the direction opposite of that which
have been reviewed. The Chief of the Advisory Group makes a
report concurrently to the Ambassador and the Unified Com-
mander. The Ambassador in turn forwards his recommendation
to the Secretary of State via the diplomatic chain. The
Unified Commander reports his findings concurrently to
the Joint Chiefs, the Director of Military Assistance, and
the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force Departments, who
thereafter advise the Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs of their appraisals of the grant. Within
the military organization, the Secretary of Defense makes
the final military evaluation and, in turn, reports his con-
clusions to the Secretary of State.
Because of his legal responsibility, as the immediate
deputy of the President in all matters pertaining to foreign
aid, the Secretary of State makes the final summary report
to the President, His report recommends that the Chinese be
supplied one squadron of F-lll aircraft by military assist-
ance grant. But, in his report, the Secretary concurs with
his subordinates and recommends that the grant not be made
available until fiscal year 1970.
When the President is finally advised of the results
of the study, he may wish to advise the National Security
Council of the matter to inquire if they have any final
objections. Thereafter, if the President gives his approval
to the grant, he directs the Bureau of the Budget to prepare
plans to include the F-lll aircraft for China in the fiscal
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year 1970 foreign aid request which will be presented to
the Congress. If the Congress approves both the foreign
aid bill and the appropriations bill, the aircraft will be
made available to the Republic of China and the planning
process will be complete.
Ill APPRAISAL OF ASSISTANCE PLANNING
This illustration has been a rather idealized example.
Seldom are the issues influencing decisions on aid matters
as simple as in this case. Problems which compound mili-
tary assistance decisions may include: the ability of a
recipient to use the aid effectively; determination of
whether a recipient really requires a grant or whether the
equipment should be provided by Military Assistance Sale;
the effect of an aid project on third states; the deter-
mination of the effect that a given program has on overall
American national strategy; the difficulty of obtaining
Congressional approval for individual projects and the
total foreign aid program; the determination of whether
military assistance will be used by a recipient for
domestic political ends which may have deleterious effects
on American diplomacy, etc.
Although there are manifold problems involved in the
management of military assistance, the planning process
described in this Chapter, which was initiated with the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, has several advantages which
were not evident in previous aid planning. The major advance
results from the coordination which is applied in planning.
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Because all levels of the military assistance organization
are involved, the end result is more sensitive to the over-
all aims of aid because each level passes judgment on a proj-
ect or program. Each level injects its expert knowledge,
and consequently one echelon may be able to make evalua-
tions which escaped the other echelons. This results in a
less rapid management cycle than would exist if only one
level of the aid organization made all the decisions, but
the time expenditure is more than balanced by the expert
judgments generated through a review by the entire organi-
zation. Also, because the military services have such an
influential role in the planning, they can help insure that
each program will complement national military strategy
rather than only serve political ends. In the same way,
because all aid programs are under the administration of
the Secretary of State (subject of course to Presidential
direction), a means of checks and balances is maintained
to insure that the aid also serves the political goals of
American foreign policy. Another advantage of this plan-
ning process is that it permits each ambassador to take a
part in the planning process. This procedure aids in
enhancing the ambassador's prestige in foreign states.
Additionally, this system results in better economy because
of the broad review of plans. There are three elements of
the organization which are primarily interested in audit
evaluation: the Inspector General, Foreign Assistance; the
Bureau of the Budget; and the General Accounting Office.
These groups are basically concerned with the legality and
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economic appraisal of the programs , and thus help assure
that projects and programs are not wasteful.
A final advantage of this military assistance plan-
ning process is one which has been shown only by im-
plication. It is the process whereby aid programs are
scheduled in long-range. These plans, the World-Wide Basic
Planning Document, are formulated for five years in advance
and are planned jointly by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs and the Bureau
of the Budget. This document is not only continually re-
viewed by all the organizations described in this Chapter,
but, because it is created for a five-year period, each
project contained in it is reviewed each year, resulting in
five detailed examinations prior to its initiation. This
five-year planning permits adequate lead time for adminis-
trative review, materiel procurement, development of mili-
tary sites and installations, and personnel training for new
weapons. But in addition to these advantages, this five-
year planning offers more realistic and clear concepts which
1*5
aid in obtaining Congressional approval for aid programs. ^
Although there certainly is room for improvement in
the management of foreign assistance, great strides in
efficiency have been made in recent years. In the words of
15
For a detailed appraisal of the five-year planning
process, see Arnold Kotz, "Planning for International
Security," Public Administration Review
,
Vol. XXII, No. 1,
Winter 1962, pp. 213-220.
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one administrator , Gen. W. B. Palmer 3 U. S. A., who has
been intimately connected with planning as past Director
of Military Assistance:
And it is a fact, in my professional judgment,
that our military assistance is being used with
steadily improved efficiency to produce in-
creasingly effective forces, even though that
same judgment also tells me that there is hardly
a country where the forces are yet up to the
standards of United States forces in tactical
and logistical effectiveness. They started
practically from zero effectiveness and they
are immensely more effective than they were.-'-"
IV SUMMARY
The Draper Report pinpointed a number of deficiencies
in the American foreign aid program. As a result, several
new management procedures were incorporated into the Foreign
Assistance Act, and other new techniques were employed in
foreign aid administration. The most important management
change was the decentralization of the military assistance
planning process. This new procedure was designed to en-
able all echelons of the military assistance organizations
to evaluate projects and programs and to take a construc-
tive role in planning. As a consequence, military assistance
programs are planned and reviewed from the top to the bottom
of the organization—from the President through the National
Security Council, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
-i r
Gen. W. B. Palmer, "Military Assistance Program:




Security Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secre-
taries of the Service Departments, the Director of
Military Assistance, the Unified Commander, the Ambassador,
to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group.
This decentralized planning process insures that all
organizations administering military assistance have the
opportunity and obligation to critically evaluate the mili-
tary assistance programs, thus assuring that there is a
minimum of unrealistic programming. Besides this decen-
tralization of review and decision making, another pro-
cedure which has been developed to help insure efficient
management is the audit system employed within the Foreign
Assistance Act. The Act established an office of Inspector
General, Foreign Assistance, who operates within the Depart-
ment of State and is charged with the responsibility of
reviewing all foreign aid programs to insure that they are
administered in accordance with existing law and sound
business practices. The Inspector General, the auditors of
the Service Departments, the Bureau of the Budget, and the
General Accounting Office help insure that the Military
Assistance Program is managed as efficiently as possible.
In addition to this decentralized planning and con-
stant auditing, another feature of the contemporary foreign
aid administration is long-range planning. By this pro-
cedure, a World-Wide Basic Planning Document is prepared by
foreign aid planners in which programs are developed for a
five-year period. This Document is also reviewed each year
prior to a final decision on a given project or program.
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As a result, each program is analyzed five times prior to
ultimate implementation. This long-range planning not only
insures adequate lead-time for personnel training and
weapons production,, but it also helps in obtaining Con-
gressional approval for foreign aid appropriations
.
These three management techniques-- decentralized
planning, continuous audit, and long-range planning--have
resulted in a management system which is distinctly more
efficient than previous programs and more sensitive to the




MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The effect of military assistance on National Security
Policy has been shown by implication in the preceding chap-
ters. Although it is not within the scope of this study to
evaluate the present American strategy, nor to offer alter-
natives to it j it is possible to describe how military
assistance adds to the flexibility in planning which is
available to the national and military strategists and to
cite several specific advantages which accrue to strategists
because of military aid.
The most fundamental national interest of the United
States is American national security--the requirement to
maintain American territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence. It soon became patently obvious after World War
II that American security was in danger as a result of
Soviet designs to acquire hegemony over all of Europe. Had
the Soviets gained control of all of Europe, it would have
given them an industrial and manpower potential exceeding
that of the United States with the result that the balance
of world power would probably have fallen irrevocably to
the Soviets. Consequently, it became a vital interest of
the United States to maintain its balance of power equality
with the Soviet Union. From this national interest grew the
objective of preventing the expansion of Soviet control and
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Influence in Europe beyond that which the Soviets had
already gained as a result of World War II conquest.
As the confusion resulting directly from the War
diminished,, the first glaring examples of Soviet expansion
were manifested by attempts to conquer Greece by supporting
guerrilla warfare; and by attempts , by means of political
pressure and intimidation,, to force the Turks into granting
territorial concessions and navigation rights through the
Straits. In response to these Soviet moves, the United
States developed a policy of opposing Soviet expansion, and
the policy was enunciated in a speech by President Truman
on March 12, 19^7* which came to be known as the Truman
Doctrine. From this Doctrine, the containment policy was
developed.
The first significant commitment to support this con-
tainment policy was the Greek-Turkish Aid Program of 19^-7.
The striking success of the Program in preventing Soviet
achievement of their Greek and Turkish objectives justified
the validity of the policy, and the experience demonstrated
the feasibility and necessity of maintaining pressure
against any possible Soviet expansion. Consequently, the
containment policy was expanded into a forward defense
strategy whereby the United States sought to create effec-
tive and credible military forces along the Soviet perimeter.
Then, with the rise of a Communist state in China, the same
strategy was employed in Asia against Communist China.
In order to implement this forward defense strategy,
the United States undertook commitments to extend economic,
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technical, and military aid to those American allies which
could help develop the military forces required to oppose
Soviet and Chinese military power. This military assist-
ance created several distinct advantages to planners of
American National Security Policy.
I SHARING MANPOWER
One of the greatest advantages which had accrued to
the United States as a result of military assistance is the
vastly greater amount of manpower which is maintained under
arms and which is available to counter Communist armies.
Even if the United States chose to accept the direct finan-
cial costs of maintaining military manpower levels at two
or three times the size of current forces , the price
involved would be heavy because industry would lose a sig-
nificant portion of the youthful, healthy, and generally
well-educated men who are required, for military service.
Therefore, because military assistance and Supporting
Assistance enables the American allies to maintain large
military establishments, the need for the United States to
As an example of the financial savings gained by the
subsidization of foreign troops, one may compare the rela-
tive costs of supporting an American soldier with the costs
of supporting a foreign one. The average yearly cost of
maintaining one American is $3^9^3J one Japanese is $917;
and one Chinese on Taiwan is $194. .Source: United States
Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria-
tions, Hearings Before the House Committee on Appropriations
,
F or e ign Operations Appropriations For 19B"5 ,Tart 1, 66th




maintain manpower levels equal to those of the Communist
states is eliminated.
II GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES
A second advantage accruing to American strategists
as a result of military assistance is the ability of the
United States to position military forces on the Sino-Soviet
borders in order to implement the forward defense strategy. 2
These forces are both allied and American. By the granting
of military assistance, the United States has actually been
able to create indigenous armies in those states which border
China and the Soviet Union. Of equal importance is the fact
that these aid-recipient states also permit the United States
to deploy American forces on their soil as a quid pro quo
of American aid. Considering United States' lack of overseas
possessions, this ability to deploy American forces through-
out the Sino-Soviet perimeter is of vital importance to
American security. Without the presence of American power
and influence in these forward areas, it is reasonable to
assume that these areas would have fallen into the Communist
orbit by default. The only alternative to an American
presence and American treaty guarantees would be the
2
American military assistance recipients are situated
along virtually the entire perimeter of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Those states which directly border these Communist states
are: Norway, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,.
Turkey, Iran, India, Burma, Laos, South Vietnam, and the
Republic of Korea. Other states very near the perimeter
which provide strategic locations are the European NATO




reliance on, or use of, strategic nuclear warfare—the only-
strategy the United States would be able to employ if
foreign bases and forces were unavailable. As an example of
the importance of this concept, the mere presence of token
American forces in Berlin ipso facto makes Berlin a vital
American outpost which would involve a direct American-
Soviet confrontation if the Soviet Union chose to initiate
hostilities in or about the city. Consequently, American
presence throughout the world enables American strategists
to employ more flexibility in planning than would be
possible without this American overseas deployment. The
only alternative available would be the "Fortress America-
strategic nuclear warfare strategy" that would be the least
flexible and most rigid of American alternative national
strategies
.
There are other subsidiary advantages that accrue as
a result of American-created military forces and American
presence overseas. American armies give visual evidence
of American presence and interest in local populations.
In many cases they contribute to the goodwill existing be-
tween the United States and its allies. It is granted that
there is validity in the adage that "familiarity breeds
contempt," but it is also true that exposure of Americans




III PLANS AND POLICY
A further advantage that American policy makers and
strategists gain as a result of military assistance is the
ability of the United States to shape the national policies
and military strategies of American aid-recipient allies.
This can be accomplished in two basic ways. In the first
instance , in a quantitative manner, the very fact that the
United States grants any military assistance to a country
permits the United States to gain some influence in the
policies of the recipient. The influence may be both direct
and indirect. In the direct sense, the influence may induce
the recipient country to formulate plans and policies which
are complementary to American objectives. As an example, by
extending military assistance to Japan, the United States
has induced the Japanese to build a military establishment
whose capabilities supplement those of the United States,
and are directed toward the Commnunist states of China and
the Soviet Union. In the indirect sense, military aid
granted to a foreign state may not support a military estab-
lishment which is directly allied with American forces
against a Communist state, but the resulting foreign mili-
tary establishment may be used by the recipient to promote
its independence from Communist domination. A prime example
of this negative influence is in the case of Yugoslavia.
Although military assistance extended to Yugoslavia in the
late 1940 's and early 1950's did not induce Tito to join the
North Atlantic Treaty, it did enable the Yugoslavs to chart
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an independent course in Europe and thus denied to the
Soviets complete domination over that country.
3
In a qualitative sense, the United States maintains
a control over the policies and strategies of recipients
as a result of the kind of equipment and training extended.
By selectively granting assistance, the United States can
determine the composition, strength, and employment strategy
of recipients' military forces. As. an example, American
strategists have determined that a large mutual defense land'
army situated in eastern Asia, as a counterpoise to Chinese
armies, would be of vital assistance in deterring Chinese
aggression. In order to create such a force, the United
States has granted the kinds of materiels and training to
the Republic of Korea that has enabled the Koreans to ex-
ploit their great manpower resources and build a great land
army. On the other hand, the assistance provided for the
Korean Navy and Air Force is relatively small. If American
strategists determined that a greater emphasis would be re-
quired in air capabilities on the part of the Koreans, the
United States could then undertake to create a larger Korean
Air Force and decrease the strength of the Army. Thus it
can be seen that the nature of the military assistance
In the late 1940' s, the aid extended to Yugoslavia
consisted of credits, raw materiels for its armament produc-
tion, and food supplies for its troops. But in March 1951,
Yugoslavia was permitted to purchase military aircraft from
the NATO powers; in April 1951 France granted arms to Yugo-
slavia; and in June 1951 the United States sent more than
$1 million worth of arms to that country. Brown and Opie,
op. cit., pp. 426, 427, 498.
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granted can determine the composition of forces and their
employment by recipients. The importance of these facts
can easily be underestimated. In the words of William R.
Kintner
:
The influence of the United States military
assistance program on the forces structure
of many of our allies has led to an intertwining
of military, political, and economic decisions
at the seat of our government in Washington.^
IV PROPAGANDA
One of the most valuable products of military assist-
ance is the benefit which the United States gains from the
training and education of foreign military personnel under
the provisions of military assistance programs. The total
number of personnel receiving training is enormous. In
1961 alone, some 18,000 foreign military personnel received
some type of American training, lasting from as little as
one week to as long as several years --the average period
being about six months. The total' for the years between
1950 and 1959 reached more than 100,000. This training was
conducted at over 140 American military installations and
civilian installations in over thirty different states. In
addition, formal training is also conducted at special
American- operated schools outside the United States, a
notable example being the Latin American schools conducted
by the Army and Air Force at American bases in the Panama
4
William R. Kintner, "The Politicalization of
Strategy," National Security , David M. Abshire and Richard V.




Canal Zone. And finally,, there are over 4,000 Americans
conducting a myriad of formal and informal training pro-
grams overseas under the Military Assistance Advisory Group
5programs
.
These training and education courses provide two
broad advantages for the United States. In the more obvious
context, the foreign students learn the technical skills
which are necessary to operate American equipment. Also,
the training provides indoctrination in the American con-
cepts of tactics and strategy. Understanding these prin-
ciples enable the foreign military services to integrate
their operational forces with American units in a more
effective manner than would be possible without such indoc-
trination. As a result of this technical training, American
strategists can make more meaningful appraisals of the mili-
tary capabilities of our aid-recipient allies. Furthermore,
the choice and development of curricula can assist in shap-
ing the tactics, strategies, and policies of these allies.
But in addition to these more obvious advantages,
there is the less tangible asset resulting from foreign
students' exposure to American society while residing in the
United States, and from the formal courses of study taken
in service and civilian institutions. Although the bene-
fits derived from residence and study in the United States
5Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, Military
Assistance Training Programs of the U.S. Government ("New





is valuable in developing understanding and rapport among
the enlisted personnel of American and foreign services , it
is the foreign officer corps which serves as the most
fertile soil for American indoctrination. In many newly-
emerging and underdeveloped states, the military is fre-
quently the only stable elite which exists, and it is these
military services which maintain the vitality and stability
of their governments and the direction of the indigenous
polity. The opportunity to educate these officers at
senior American military colleges can have a significant
effect on the national and strategic orientation of these
foreign states. American indoctrination programs can help
to ameliorate the xenophobic and chauvinistic attitudes of
foreign officer corps and help them develop a realistic
perspective of American interests and policies. As a con-
sequence, these officers may be expected to cooperate more
readily in the execution of American global strategy.
As an example of the influence which foreign officers
frequently hold and gain in foreign states, one may examine
briefly the case of foreign naval officers attending a ten
month course at the United States Naval War College. In
1957* the Navy created a new program, the Naval Command
Course, which was designed exclusively for the officers of
allied navies in the rank of captain and senior commander.
6
The information and details of the Naval Command
Course were obtained in an interview, in November 1965, with
the Plans Officer of the Naval Command Course, United States
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
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This course is basically oriented around a study of sea-
power, but it also has a heavy emphasis on international
affairs. In addition, the syllabus of the course provides
for several lengthy field trips throughout the United States
in order that these foreign students may visit various
military installations, industrial plants, business organi-
zations, and government activities. During these trips, the
foreign officers are hosted by influential members of
American society, business, military, and government. Since
the beginning of this course, 231 foreign officers have been
graduated from the Naval Command Course through Spring 1965;
of these, 56 have attained flag rank, 12 have become the
equivalent of the Chief of Naval Operations in their navies,
and 1 has served several months as president of his country.
Each year the Naval War .College prints a newsletter
which is sent to each of the graduates of the Naval Command
Course. This letter is compiled from responses to ques-
tionnaires sent to each of the graduates in which they are
asked to describe their military activities. The graduates
invariably comment on the value of their study at the Naval
War College, and the consistently favorable responses seem
to preclude the possibility that these acknowledgments are
less than honest appraisals and flattering gestures of good-
will. Of significance is the fact that many graduates in-
dicate that, in their professional duties, they are meeting
an ever- increasing number of contemporaries from other
countries who are also Naval War College graduates. Through
this program, the United States gains several valuable
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advantages. The course provides an opportunity to give
these officers both direct and indirect indoctrination into
American concepts of strategy, political philosophy, and
national interests, goals, and objectives. The assumption
motivating this indoctrination is that when foreign officers
can be clearly shown American purposes, they are better
equipped to make judgments about American conduct, and are
more likely to gain an empathy with Americans. Not only
does this course help provide cooperation between American
and foreign officers, but with the increasing number of
graduates, these officers can better communicate with each
other in affairs that are not directly associated with
their relations with the United States.
With the necessary format variations, similar pro-
grams exist for foreign officers in each of the senior
7
service colleges. By means of this military assistance
education, the United States has created a cadre of foreign
military officers who have had a first-hand opportunity to
study American national security interests, policies, objec-
tives, and commitments and have gained the knowledge which
enables them to make realistic appraisals of American con-
duct in world affairs. Furthermore, these foreign service
personnel are extremely better equipped to combine their
services with American units because of their understanding
7For a list of American military schools which con-
duct training and education for foreign service personnel,




of American strategy and tactics and because of the English
language proficiency they have acquired through residence
in the United States. Finally, because of their exposure
to the United States and American people, they gain an under-
standing of the United States and its people which would be
impossible to acquire by study in their own countries. As
a result of all these factors, there is the official assump-
tion, and this researcher agrees with it, that these Ameri-
can-educated foreign military are not only better prepared
professionally, but are also predisposed to cooperate effec-
tively in the planning and execution of global strategy
designed to protect American national security and the
national security of our mutual security allies.
V EQUIPMENT STANDARDIZATION
A further effect on American national security plans
which military assistance has provided is in the standardiza-
tion of arms between the United States and its allies. The
kinds of equipment which is mutually being used by the
United States and its allies varies from small side arms to
complex weapons systems such as fleet ballistic missiles
o
and aircraft weapons systems. Although it might appear
that this reliance on American equipment would limit the
flexibility of procurement and planning by our allies,
8
For unclassified examples of the kinds of equipment
which is jointly used by the United States and its recipient
allies, see: Information and Guidance
, op. cit., pp. 127-30,
and Hovey, op. cit., pp. 1^1-lbti.

127
actually a considerable amount of American- designed equip-
ment is produced in foreign countries by means of military
assistance agreements.
The standardization of equipment results in several
important advantages for both the United States and its
allies. It reduces development and production costs be-
cause., by joint use of a given weapon, costly expenses
related to providing two different weapons to perform
similar functions is eliminated. Furthermore, logistical
problems are considerably reduced because parts inventories
required are considerably less for one system than for
several. Also, with standardization of equipment, parts
availability is enhanced because appropriate inventories
must be maintained by each country, and thus are available
for exchange between allied services.
Another advantage is the decrease in time and cost
expenses involved in training. As an example, the Federal
Republic of Germany is able to train its fighter pilots at a
United States Aix Force Base which trains Americans to fly
the same aircraft, the F-104, used by both the United States
and Germany. This procedure results in significant savings
for the Germans, who may then use the savings for other
mutually advantageous defense expenditures.
An additional advantage of standardization is that
tactical and strategic planners are readily familiar with
the operational characteristics of standardized equipment,
and thus can develop more realistic plans than would be
possible if each of the American allies had its own
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completely unique equipment. Also, as a corollary of this
fact, standardization improves the ability of allies to
communicate on technical matters.
As a result of these benefits of standardization,
largely derived from provisions of military assistance,
American strategy planners gain increased flexibility.
They are aware of the capabilities of weapons employed by
recipients; they are able to program weapons to recipients
which will best contribute to the overall strategic posture
of both the United States and its allies; they have fewer
logistics problems involved in planning; and the financial,
time, and manpower savings resulting from standardization
can be employed in other areas to increase alliance defense
posture.
VI STRATEGIC RAW MATERIELS
Partly by means of military assistance grants, the
United States has been able to both insure continual access
to many of the world's strategic raw mater iels and to deny
effective access of many resources to Communist powers. A
significant example is the oil of the Middle East. In
Chapter II it was shown that military and economic aid to
Greece and Turkey since 19^7 has enabled those two states to
maintain their independence. In addition, in the late 1940'
s
the United States extended aid to Iran to insure that the
country could maintain its political independence in the
face of continuing Soviet efforts to gain influence and con-




assistance, the United States has been able to deny to the
Soviets effective expansion into the Middle East. As a
consequence of this successful containment policy, which was
largely implemented by military assistance grants, the
Western states have been able to continually maintain access
to the oil of the Arab states and deny effective access of
the oil to the Soviet Union.
This containment policy is, in a sense, indirect in
nature, but military aid has also had a direct effect. The
United States has granted military assistance to Iraq,
Lebanon, Libya, Saudia Arabia, and the United Arab Republic.
In a positive sense, this aid has been able to purchase
access to Arab oil supplies. As a quid pro quo of aid, the
United States has at least tacitly required that Western oil
interests are granted appropriate considerations and con-
cessions by these Arab states.
Although it is admittedly impossible to assess
accurately the degree of influence which military aid has
had in enabling the United States to maintain access to the
world's raw resources, it has some bearing on American suc-
cess in this pursuit in many situations. Today the United
States is able to obtain easily the world's essential minerals
and chemicals . The importance of these materials is fre-
quently underestimated. The United States is obliged to
import between ninety and one hundred per cent of the fol-
lowing vital war materials: rubber, antimony, platinum,
nickel, cobalt, beryllium, manganese, diamonds, chrome, and




requirements of bauxite and tungsten must be imported.
Each of these raw materials is absolutely vital for the
manufacture of modern armaments. As an example, in a typical
American jet aircraft, the following metals are required for
production and the percentage of the metals which are im-
ported are as follows: chromium, 92 per cent; nickel, 97 per
cent; aluminum, j6 per cent; cobalt, 88 per cent. It is
self-evident that without these raw materials, the United
States would be unable to build the necessary military estab-
lishment which is necessary to support the American national
interest
.
Although it is granted that many factors affect the
ability of the United States to obtain the vital resources
of the world, military assistance aids in the acquisition.
It is accomplished in two basic ways: by denying the land
in which the resources lie to Communist control, and by
obtaining access to the resources as a return for the grant
of aid.
VII SUMMARY
The most fundamental interest of the United States is
national security- -territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence. In order to insure American national security,
9Norman J. Paddleford and George A. Lincoln, The
Dynamic
s
of International Politics (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1^64 J, p. 09.
Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations (sec-
ond edition; New York: The MacmTTlan Company, ±9b2), p. 54.
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the United States has formulated a policy of containment of
Communist powers--mainly the Soviet Union and., secondarily,
China. These powers represent a threat to American security
because of their actual and potential national power and
because of their stated policies of destroying democratic
states. In order to implement the containment policy, the
United States has formulated a forward defense strategy
which is designed to restrict Communist power to those areas
it presently occupies . Additionally, the United States has
created an alliance system composed of states whose security
is also threatened by Communist power. In order to make the
military power of these allies credible, the United States
has granted military assistance to these states. Because
of the resulting strength of these alliance states, the
United States has enjoyed a flexibility in formulating
American national security strategy and policy.
Many specific benefits have. accrued to the United
States as a result of the military assistance grants.
Military assistance enables the United States to act as the
leader of a coalition of non-Communist states which has a
vast reservoir of manpower and arms. In addition, military
assistance helps the United States in gaining access to
lands lying along the Sino-Soviet border; a sine qua non
of the forward defense strategy. By means of making selec-
tive grants of military aid, the United States has acquired
a significant influence in the formulation of national
policies and strategies of our aid-recipient allies. By
means of the training and education programs conducted under
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military assistance projects, the United States is able to
indoctrinate our allied officers on American strategy and
policy goals and is able to create the educational atmos-
phere which tends to make allied personnel sympathetic
toward American policies. The standardization of equip-
ment and training resulting from military assistance pro-
grams also supports American national security policy
formulation because it permits more effective integration
of allied forces. And finally, military aid helps the
United States gain access to the raw materials which are
essential for producing the allied military establishments
which serve as the ultimate tool of American national
strategy and foreign policy.

CHAPTER IX
MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS A TOOL OF DIPLOMACY
I RELATIONS WITH WEAK STATES
The Secretary of State., under the direction of the
President, is designated by law as the American official
primarily responsible for the overall direction of all
foreign assistance, including military assistance. With
this authority, the Secretary has a valuable tool for the
implementation of American foreign policy. And, by the use
of this tool, the United States can exert a significant,
frequently vital, influence on recipient states. The most
notable current example is South Vietnam. Today the country
is under an overwhelming influence of the United States
because of its reliance on American foreign assistance. The
viability of any Saigon regime is entirely dependent on
American financial aid, and that government's war against
the Viet Cong is wholly contingent on American military
supplies and, to a great extent, on American military
guidance and leadership. The very existence of South
Vietnam as a sovereign state is predicated on the con-
tinuance of American assistance; for, if American aid should
cease, there is no other country in the Western Bloc which
would be capable or willing to support South Vietnam's
economy and military operations. Thus, American military

assistance provides what is probably the most influential
diplomatic tool of the United States in its relations with
South Vietnam--and as a consequence, with all of Southeast
Asia.
A similar example could be cited in the case of the
Republic of Korea. Continued American military aid and
Supporting Assistance is a sine qua non of Korea's ability
to maintain its integrity as an independent nation. Should
American assistance cease, Korea's military establishment
and economy would collapse and the country would be vul-
nerable to any renewed aggression by the North Koreans,
abetted by the Chinese. As a result of this immense re-
liance on American aid, the United States enjoys a most
favorable influence over the Government of South Korea.
These two cases demonstrate how influential military
assistance is as a tool of American diplomacy vis-a-vis aid-
dependent states.
II RELATIONS WITH STRONG STATES
Even strong powers are influenced by American mili-
tary assistance. When, in 1962, the United States opted to
discontinue the development of the Skybolt air-to-ground
missile system, the decision caused considerable frustra-
tions and annoyance in Great Britain because that country
had intended to purchase the Skybolt system and to employ it
as the second generation strategic striking weapon. The
News item in the New York Times, December J, 1962.
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Mac Mil Ian Government came under severe political criticism
from the opposition party and the press. In addition, rela-
tions between the United States and Great Britain became
tense. It was only President Kennedy's offer to Britain to
assist her to obtain and develop a Polaris ballistic missile
system that ameliorated the strained relations. Thus, by
the use of military grants and sales agreements to supply
the Polaris system, President Kennedy was able to make use
of a powerful diplomatic tool to insure continual cooperative
relations with a great power ally.
Although the above cases are rather dramatic examples
of the importance of military assistance as a tool of diplo-
macy, the less publicized and more subtle means of using
military aid as a diplomatic lever may have an even greater
cumulative effect. The great mass of American influence on
foreign nations, and concomitantly on American diplomacy,
results not from spontaneous and obvious situations and in-
cidents, but from the influence the United States has gained
over recipient nations as the result of aid treaties and
agreements. There are strings attached to all gifts—mili-
tary assistance included. Consequently, a review of the
various agreements the United States concludes with recipi-
ents of military assistance will give an insight into the





In the period immediately following World War II, the
United States had few restrictions attached to military
assistance, but with increasing Congressional review and
criticism of foreign aid, and with the improved administra-
tive procedures which developed with time, control over
assistance became more exacting. In Chapter VI of this
study, eligibility requirements for assistance contained in
the Foreign Assistance Act were described. Many of these
eligibility criteria require that the recipient country
enter into formal agreements with the United States which
specify the conditions under which the United States will
grant the aid. An examination of some of these contracts
will demonstrate their importance as tools of American
diplomacy.
VESSEL LOAN AGREEMENTS
Because of the unit cost involved and because of the
relatively long service life of combat ships, the Congress
has reserved for itself the right to make the final deter-
mination on the feasibility of granting or loaning naval
vessels to foreign states. As a result, each grant or loan
requires a separate and special act of Congress.
2
Details of these agreements are generally classified
The information contained in this section on agreement stipu-
lations has been acquired from an unclassified source:




Consequently, the Congress is able to stipulate the exact
provisions to be contained in each transfer of a naval
vessel and is able to require the recipient state to agree
in particular detail to certain conditions,, such as the
period of the loan, the employment of the vessel, the dis-




As recipients of American military assistance have be-
come more affluent", they have been able to afford an in-
creasing share of the cost of military items which they
require. But in most cases, they still have not been able
to develop the industry and technology which permits them to
manufacture complete weapons systems. Consequently, the
United States may find it advantageous in certain cases to
provide recipient states certain parts of a given weapon
system and permit the recipient state to complete the system
with its own components. But prior to granting part of the
system, the recipient state must agree to enter into a cost-
sharing agreement wherein the United States is able to
specify the use of the completed system and the share of the
costs to be borne by both the United States and the recipi-
ent. An example of such an agreement is one which the
United States entered into with Norway. That country was
able to produce a basic naval vessel but was unable to manu-
facture the modern weapons needed to equip it. Under a
cost-sharing agreement, the United States provided those
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components of the vessel which the Norwegians could not.
Because the American equipment was provided by means of
military assistance grants, the United States required a
cost-sharing agreement which specified the employment of the




In 195^1-, the United States initiated a program to pro-
vide technical and financial assistance to Western European
states in order that they could reestablish and expand their
ordnance industries. In return for this military aid, the
recipient states were obliged to agree to American conditions
which prescribed that the products of these industries would
be made available to all NATO members at reasonable and non-
discriminating prices. In addition, the United States was
able to establish the criteria under which the products of
these states could be sold to other non-Communist countries.
WEAPONS PRODUCTION AGREEMENTS
The Facilities Assistance Agreements were designed to
subsidize the production of basic armaments and explosives.
As technological advances occurred, it became desirable to
foster the manufacture of more sophisticated armaments by
the NATO allies. Consequently, Weapons Productions Agree-
ments were initiated in order to assist Western European
states to manufacture more advanced weapons than were
planned under the Facilities Agreements. The Weapons
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Production Agreements differed from previous ones primarily
in the nature of the armaments produced. They also provided
for continuation of essential programs established under
the Facilities Agreements.
MUTUAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AGREEMENTS
The two previous programs provided military assist-
ance in order that American allies could build weapons
which had already been developed by the United States. By
means of these Development Agreements , the United States
began to assist allies to develop and build advanced
weapons systems. This is done by granting financial and
technological assistance for research and development costs
of weapons systems which have yet to be created. But these
agreements still permit the United States to have a sig-
nificant influence in the manufacture and disposition of the
resulting mutually developed armaments. These agreements
indicated the growing technological competence of our allies,
OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT AGREEMENTS
Because of lower production costs in foreign coun-
tries and because the United States desires to assist the
economic growth of our allies., the United States has under-
taken to enter into Offshore Production Agreements with
certain states, whereby these countries manufacture selected
military products for use by the several states which are
members of mutual defense alliances. Certain costs of pro-
duction, under these agreements, are provided by military
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assistance funds. In return,, the recipient states must
agree to specific American requirements which include:
quality standards, cost limitations, security criteria,
storage arrangements, the priorities for allocation among
the allies, etc.
DISPOSITION OF EXCESS AGREEMENTS
These agreements provide rules for the final disposi-
tion of equipment and supplies provided under military assist.
ance when the aid articles are no longer useful. When re-
cipient states accept American aid, they are obliged to
conclude these agreements which allow the United States to
determine whether American- supplied equipment must be
returned to the United States, may be sold to third states,
or may be scrapped. In addition, these agreements provide
for possible compensation to the United States if the
articles or supplies are sold .or destroyed for scrap. If
the United States desires, any proceeds from sale or scrap




Since 1926 the United States has provided American
military officers and enlisted men to Latin American coun-
tries in order to assist the Latins in the training of their
military services. These American detachments serve in the
same capacity as the Military Assistance Advisory Groups
which have been established in other countries since the end
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of World War II. By means of these Mission Agreements, the
United States is able to exert some diplomatic influence in
the state which requests and receives their services.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP AGREEMENTS
These contracts specify the degree of control and
direction which the American military personnel may enjoy
over the military services of the recipient states. In some
countries
_,
such as South Vietnam and Korea, the control over.
the indigenous military establishments is extensive; whereas
in other states, the Advisory Groups serve mainly as business
representatives of the Department of Defense. In general,
the more developed and powerful a state is, the less direct
influence the Advisory Groups have within the country.
TAX RELIEF AGREEMENTS
In the past, the United States experienced the para-
doxical situation in which some recipient states levied im-
port taxes on the aid received under military assistance
programs. In order to preclude such anachronisms, the
United States presently requires that recipient states enter
into agreements with the United States to waive any taxes
on grants of equipment, supplies, or facilities provided.
PATENT AGREEMENTS
These agreements provide for disclosure of patented
and technological information on defense matters to mutual
defense allies. In return for the information, recipients
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are obliged to protect the patented information and to
assure the security of the classified information. Finally,
these agreements contain provisions for compensation to the
American patent holders.
ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENTS
The United States makes certain classified atomic
information available to NATO allies. By entering these
agreements , these allies must assure the United States that
the information provided is treated with the standards of
security which are outlined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
Each of these agreements represent some facet of mili-
tary assistance and, because they are negotiated by the
Department of State, they are used as tools of diplomacy.
They demonstrate the extensive influence which the United
States is able to employ as a result of various military
assistance programs. In return for each grant, sale, loan,
exchange, or service which is provided to allies, the United
States is able to acquire some kind of specified advantage
or concession which is legally binding by means of a treaty
or contract. But in the realm of international politics,
the United States also gains diplomatic advantages and
leverage by demands which supersede these legal contracts.
The United States can impose diplomatic pressure on a recipi-
ent state to comply with a course of action or a policy
which the United States desires.
As an example of such political leverage, the United
States can not only specify the use of military aid, but can
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also prohibit its employment in certain cases in the inter-
est of American foreign policy. Consequently, military aid
extended to Portugal is specifically excluded from being
used in Angola or Mozambique. The purpose of this prohibi-
tion is obvious; it alleviates criticism from independent
black African states that the United States is aiding and
abetting a colonial power in suppressing black Africans.
Similarly, military aid to Latin America incorporates cer-
tain prohibitions of use. The aid may not be used for
internal security purposes unless the threat to security
originates from outside the hemisphere. The aid may not be
employed to crush indigenous revolts. Here again, the United
States desires to avoid the criticism that America supports
totalitarian regimes which may currently be in power and
with which the United States is obliged to deal. Also, it
helps avoid the criticism that the United States is in-
ordinately involved in domestic Latin politics.
Another diplomatic role of military assistance is its
use in the pursuit of world peace outside the realm of the
East-West confrontation. When conflicts arise between states
which are closely or nominally allied with the United States,
the threat of or actually halting of military aid may be
used as a diplomatic device to help resolve the disagreement.
In the case of the Cyprus issue, the United States was a
military ally of both Greece and Turkey, two of the parties
involved in the dispute. By the threat of ceasing military
aid to these two states, the United States was able to use
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military assistance as one sort of deterrence to a Greek-
Turkish war.
Probably a more significant example of this kind of
diplomatic influence was the case surrounding the war be-
tween India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965. Prior to
the conflict , Pakistan was a firm American military ally and
it received the vast majority of its military equipment from
the United States. Although India was ostensibly "non-
aligned.," that country received extensive American economic
aid and this assistance indirectly helped the Indians main-
tain their large army. Also, the United States had con-
tributed some military equipment to India following the
Chinese invasion of India in 1964. When the war erupted
between India and Pakistan, the United States made strong
public statements indicating that the United States would
halt all military aid to both countries until they re-
's
solved their differences.-' As . a concurrent policy, the
United States threatened to stop food shipments to India in a
further attempt to end the war. Although it is not possible
to accurately assess the degree of influence which these
threats had upon both states to agree to a cease fire, it is
reasonable to assume it did have some influence. Thus it can
again be seen that by granting assistance and denying it as
the circumstances determine, the United States employs an
effective diplomatic tool in the conduct of its foreign policy
and diplomacy.




Military Assistance is employed by the United States
as an important tool of diplomacy. In order to receive
assistance from the United States, recipients must pay some
kind of price, and the costs include legal obligations in-
curred through treaties and acquiescence to American diplo-
matic pressures." By means of several kinds of bilateral aid
agreements, recipient states oblige themselves legally to
satisfy American requirements for aid. These obligations
include stipulations regulating the use of provided assist-
ance, disposition of granted equipment, security of military
articles and information, and joint financial arrangements.
In addition to such contractual obligations, the United
States can use assistance as a lever in diplomatic bargain-
ing. It can require recipients to undertake certain actions
and policies which are in the American interest in return
for the grant of aid. Also, the United States can influence
recipient states by the threat to halt aid. By means of
securing desired quid pro quos for military assistance, the




I CRITICISM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Since the United States "began its modern Military
Assistance Program., with the passage of the Greek-Turkish
Aid Program of 19^7, there has been continual criticism of
military aid from several influential quarters. The
criticism emanates from the Congress, from certain authors
and columnists, and from parts of the academic community.
CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM
Some members of Congress have been opposed to military
aid for two basic reasons. Certain ones have concluded that
Harold A. Hovey has analyzed several "classical"
criticisms directed against military assistance. They in-
clude: "military aid is furnished to dictators," "military
assistance is an endless program," "military assistance is
trying to do too much for too many," "European nations should
do more to help the United States bear its world burdens,"
"military aid causes a drain in the United States balance of
payments," "military aid is given to communist countries,"
military aid is run by incompetents," "military aid en-
courages large military forces where they are not needed,"
"military assistance discourages economic development,"
"military aid provides equipment which recipients cannot
utilize," and "military assistance causes arms races."
In his review of these arguments, Hovey has shown that in







the results of the program are ineffective and that it has
been maladministered. The effectiveness is questioned pri-
marily on the grounds that the military services of the
allies which we support do not measure up to American
standards of military efficiency. To this argument., one can
only agree that none of the United States' allies possess
the same combat capabilities as the American services. But
the validity of these objections must be measured within the
framework of the industrial, financial, and population reali-
ties of aid-recipient states. One can hardly expect that
countries, whose wealth and industrial production is but a
fraction of that of the United States, can create a military
capability even approaching that of the United States. Yet
these critics argue that military aid, particularly to the
smaller states, is wasted because it does not contribute in
a meaningful manner to the overall security of the United
States. This very criticism seems to call for increased aid
to recipients, rather than curtailment, if one accepts the
basic premise that the United States needs to maintain these
allies within our alliance system.
The second criticism generally emanating from Congress
takes the form of charging maladministration of military
assistance; but a study of Congressional hearings on the
subject can lead to a conclusion that a certain amount of
such censure is motivated by purely domestic political con-
siderations. Congressmen are frequently subject to pressures
from their constituents to limit federal expenditures. It is
easy for the Congressman to show his supporters the effects of
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federal spending when it results in pork-barrel projects and
other programs readily visible to the voter. But with
foreign aid, the projects cannot be seen by the constituents
and are thus very difficult to justify to a skeptical public.
As a result,, one of the easiest federal programs to oppose is
foreign aid--opposit ion to it appeals to economy-minded
voters and assuages their xenophobic fears. The effect of
these political realities results in yearly Congressional
battles between the military assistance advocates and the
critics of the program. An example of how tenuous some of
the arguments of aid critics become is demonstrated by a
dialogue which took place in the hearings on the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1965:
Mr. Gross. Do you have any money in this program
for the rehabilitation of Emperor Haile Selassie's
yacht ?
General Wood. You have beat the horse for
several years.
Mr. Gross. It is about time for the yacht to be
refurbished?
General Wood. It is time for its annual overhaul,
and it is currently being overhauled. It is in the
1965 program. And it is at the Boston Navy Yard.
Mr. Gross. It is there now?
General Wood. Yes, unless the work is finished.




Mr. Gross. I finally hit some paydirt today
.
Although this example appears to be an extreme one,
other similar examples could be cited from Congressional
hearings and they would give an insight into the problems
faced by aid proponents in obtaining federal funds from
Congress. Each year the fight continues and it may best be
described with the words of a most knowledgeable student of
foreign aid who wrote in 1958:
The mauling which the Mutual Security Program
received at the hands of the 85th Congress makes
it clear that the American people--or at least
their representatives—have yet to endorse un-
qualifiedly the concept of military aid as a
continuing instrument of national policy.
. . .
Peacetime military assistance, although it has
been a recognized tool of statecraft for cen-
turies, is relatively strange to Americans.
3
PRESS CRITICISM
Another source of frequent criticism of foreign aid
originates in the press. Undoubtedly some of the critics
make honest appraisals of aid and not only find fault, but
also make meaningful recommendations for the improvement of
2
Italics not in the original. This dialogue took
place during hearings conducted by the Committee On Foreign
Affairs on March 12, 1965, while General Robert J. Wood,
U.S. Army, Director of Military Assistance, was being ques-
tioned by Rep. H. R. Gross of Iowa. Source: United States
Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965
,
89th Congress, lst~^ession, on H.K. 7T5&] Fe"Druary 4-March
10, 1965. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965),
p. 690.
Amos A. Jordan, Jr., "Military Assistance and
National Policy," Orbis, Vol. II, No. 2, Summer 1958, p. 236
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the administration and management of foreign assistance.
But at the same time, much destructive criticism is
generated by authors of expose and sensationalism. A good
example of such "journalism" is a recent book written to
"awaken" the American public to the foreign aid "give-a-way.
"
On the dust jacket are the following comments: "in Peru--
we spend $125,000 on an irrigation ditch that does not irri-
gate (there was not enough water)" and "in Indonesia--we
gr/ant an emergency loan of 17 million dollars to bolster
the faltering economy. A week later President Sukarno
announces he will spend $20 million on three plush jet air-
liners." And in the same manner, the authors devote 217
pages to describe ten such incidents. The significance of
such criticism does not lie in its bias, nor that perhaps
that the cited facts may be correct, nor that financial
profit can be attributed as the motivation of its authors.
The importance of such journalism lies in the fact that such
criticism is usually a blanket indictment of all foreign aid
and that there is a susceptible audience for such sensa-
tionalism. A consequence of such writing is that it helps
mold American public opinion which in turn influences the
Congress and thus results in pressure to decrease foreign
aid in both the economic and military areas.
4
Andrew Tully and Milton Britton, Where Did Your
Money Go? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 19b4")^
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CRITICISM BY THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
A third major source of criticism of military assist-
ance comes from the academic community. Such criticism is
very influential because academics are frequently called upon
to testify during Congressional hearings on foreign aid.
In addition, the opinions of the academic community reach
the influential formulators and critics of American foreign
policy. The objections to military assistance on the part
of scholars appears to stem from their convictions based on
liberal and humanitarian grounds. In viewing the enormous
needs of mankind for increased food production and industrial
development, many academics argue that military assistance
is unproductive in achieving the goals of improving the lot
of man and insuring peace in the world. An example of such
reasoning is related by James R. Schlesinger:
The Millikin-Rostow approach
.
By far, the proposal /relating to underdeveloped
areas of the world"/ tHat has received the most
attention up to th~e present time--in a doctrinal
if not in an appropriations sense--is that
emanating from the Center of International
Studies at M.I.T. It has earned for itself a
number of enthusiastic proponents on the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and has from
time to time influenced the thinking of the
Administration. The Millikin-Rostow approach
. . .
/holds the viewy7 that the West, and par-
ticularly the United States, could not survive
as an island of freedom if the underdeveloped
nations were to turn against democracy-- .
. .
the M.I.T. proposal strongly opposes substantial
military assistance to the underdeveloped areas,
since it channels resources away from what the
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underdeveloped nations are, or should be /sic/'
interested in--economic deveTopment 75
~~
There are many similar examples which could be cited
from Congressional Reports and Hearings, books, and articles.
But they are all essentially based on three criticisms of
military assistance: (l) that the aid really does not pro-
duce a meaningful increase in American national security
because the recipient's military capabilities are not
credible and because the threat to American national
security from Communist states is decreasing; (2) that
military assistance is too expensive and it is simply a
"give-a-way"; and (3) that military aid should be replaced
by economic aid, particularly to the less developed nations.
II BENEFITS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
In spite of the many criticisms of military assist-
ance, the benefits of military aid accruing to the United
States still outweigh the alleged faults. In these previous
chapters many of them have been described, and the discussion
has alluded to several others. In order to compare the
advantages of military assistance with the criticisms of the
program, a recapitulation of the benefits and successes is
appropriate.
5James R. Schlesinger, The Political Economy of
National Security
,
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger,""Pub-
lisher, 19b0j, p. 236.
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1. American military assistance played a decisive
role in enabling the Allied powers to win a mili-
tary victory in World Wars I and II.
2. As a result of World War II, a power vacuum was
created in Central Europe. The Soviet Union
attempted to fill the vacuum and first applied
pressures on Greece and Turkey. In order to
counter these Soviet moves, the United States be-
gan the Greek-Turkish Aid Program of 19^7 and
successfully halted Soviet expansion in these areas.
A significant part of the aid to Greece was mili-
tary assistance.
3. Although the Soviets failed to gain control over
Greece and Turkey, they were successful in engi-
neering a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 19^8.
In response to this Soviet success, NATO was formed
to create a political alliance and a military force
to oppose any further Soviet encroachments in
Europe. Only massive military assistance enabled
the NATO members to build a credible military
deterrent against Soviet expansion. The Soviets
enjoyed no more territorial gains in Europe after
the institution of NATO.
4. Military assistance to the Republic of China has
enabled that state to preserve its independence and
deter the People's Republic of China from attempting
an occupation of Taiwan.
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5. Military assistance granted to the Philippines
enabled the Filipinos to successfully defeat the
Communist Hukbalahap rebels
.
6. Military assistance to Iran between 1946 and 1949
helped that state to eliminate Soviet inspired sub-
versive elements, to resist Soviet demands for
mineral concessions, and to create an effective
system of internal security.
7. The United States has created a vast network of multi-
lateral and bilateral mutual defense alliances. The
goals of these alliances have been political--to pre-
vent Communist aggression and subversion throughout
the world--but the means of these alliances has been
military strength and power. Without military assist-
ance, the American allies would have been unable to
contribute an effective share of military power.
Military assistance has been vital to the creation
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the Rio
Pact; the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; the
ANZUS Pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States; and the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO.
Also, military assistance has been the means whereby
The Republic of China, The Philippines, The Republic
of Korea, and Japan have been able to contribute
effective military commitments in support of the
bilateral mutual defense alliances into which they
have entered with the United States. Thus, military V
assistance has served as a vital means of creating
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the military power of the American mutual defense
alliance system.
8. By means of agreements which recipient states must
conclude, the United States has gained numerous
political, military, and economic concessions.
a. The United States can specify how recipients may
use the military assistance they receive.
b. The United States acquires intelligence informa-
tion on the military posture of recipients by
requiring that they permit American inspection
of their forces and installations.
c. The United States obtains military bases on the
territory of the recipients.
d. The United States gains air and sea access
rights.
e. The United States can influence the strategic
planning of recipient states by the selective
grant of equipment and training.
f. The United States may be able to prevent specific
courses of actions of recipients by threat of re-
duced assistance.
g. By means of threatening to reduce or halt aid,
the United States has a means of deterring
recipient states from undertaking hostile actions
against other states which are allied with the
United States.
h. The United States may be able to influence re-
cipient states to undertake political reforms
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by inducing their military forces to engage in
Civic Action Programs.
i. The United States can improve the economies of
some states by means of American defense and
personal spending in the recipient states.
j. The United States can assist certain Communist
states in maintaining their independence from
Moscow and Peking by means of granting military
assistance
.
k. The United States can use military assistance,
and the threat of its withdrawal, as a lever to
force recipient states to desist from trading
with states which are hostile to the United
States.
1. The United States can require recipient states
to enter into treaties which guarantee against
the expropriation of American property and
against the levying of -discriminating taxes on
American corporations.
m. The United States can require recipients to pur-
chase certain military equipment in the United
States, thus aiding the balance of payments
problem and American industry.
n. The United States can require recipients to agree
on equipment and armament standardization.
o. The United States is able to engage in extensive
indoctrination of foreign military personnel by

157
granting training and educational programs in
the United States.
p. As a repayment for military assistance, the
United States can gain access to strategic raw
materials possessed by the recipients.
q. The United States can gain economic and technical
concessions from recipients, such as patent
agreements, agreements on cost-sharing for
mutual weapon development, atomic energy in-
formation, etc.
Ill COMPARISON OF CRITICISMS AND BENEFITS
In order to make a meaningful appraisal of the Mili-
tary Assistance Program, some attention must be given to the
critics of military assistance.
COSTS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
The cost critics of military assistance, and foreign
aid in general, base their arguments on two broad considera-
tions. First, some simply hold that all foreign aid is a
waste of the American taxpayer's money. For these critics,
there is no simple answer because these people demonstrate a
lack of understanding about the dynamics of world politics
and the realities of power. One may recite the diplomatic
and strategic successes the United States has gained by em-
ploying military assistance, but a final judgment on the
value of assistance still relies on personal opinion--and
judgments based primarily on strong personal opinions are
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virtually impossible to refute. The second group of critics,
while admitting the theoretical advantages of military
assistance, base their criticism on the argument that the
results of the aid are not commensurate with the costs. To
these critics who argue that military assistance does not
provide a reasonable return for the investment, some evidence
can be offered.
In his yearly pilgrimage to Capitol Hill in search
of military assistance funds, Secretary of Defense McNamara
has offered an abundance of arguments for and statistics on
military assistance:
. . .
the military assistance program is an essential
element of our national defense and a major tool of
our foreign policy. It is for that reason that I
repeat again this year what I have said before,
there is no other money in the entire defense budget
that contributes so much to our security in my
opinion as the funds in the military assistance
program.
6
The Secretary continued his testimony by citing some
pertinent figures on military assistance granted to the
forward defense countries (Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan,
India, Thailand, The Republic of South Vietnam, The
Philippines, The Republic of Korea, and The Republic of
China). Their per capita gross national product is $168.55
whereas that of the United States is $3*239. Yet, they spend
United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on H. R. 7750 To
Amend Further The Foreign Assistance Ac1T~of 196*1 , B^tTT"
Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. T75U] February 4-March 10,




50 per cent more of their gross national product on defense
than the United States does. In again emphasizing the bar-
gain which accrues to the United States in supporting these
allies., the Secretary pointed out that the average yearly
cost of maintaining one of these forward defense area soldiers
is $497* whereas it costs the American taxpayer $4,3^-7 per
year for an American soldier.
Another point the Secretary emphasized during the
same testimony was the advantage which the United States
gains as a result of the training programs conducted for
foreign nationals under the auspices of military assistance:
".
. .
in all probability the greatest return on any portion
of our military assistance investment --dollar for dollar-
comes from the training of selected officers and key
specialists in United States schools.
. .
. These men are
the prospective leaders of their countries, and the United
States is fortunate to be able to add to their knowledge
o
and development and to win their friendship and rapport.'
Finally, Secretary McNamara has emphatically cautioned
Americans on the dangers involved in reducing or halting
military assistance. He has argued that failure to allocate
sufficient support to our allies can only weaken the defense
posture of these states, with the result that American







there is no alternative to military assistance other than
a reduction in American security and a decrease in American
foreign policy options.-^
A notable fact regarding military assistance is that
it has enjoyed the enthusiastic and wholehearted support
of every administration since the end of the Second World
War. In addressing himself to the cost critics of military
assistance and to those critics of foreign aid who maintain
that the programs are unproductive, President Kennedy offered
his evaluation of the program:
Despite noisy opposition from the very first
days--despite dire predictions that foreign aid
would 'bankrupt ' the public --despite warnings that
the Marshall Plan and successor programs were
'throwing our money down a rat-hole '--despite great
practical difficulties and some mistakes and dis-
appointment s - -thefacti^that
generally and consistently have done what they
were expected to do . 3^0
Another knowledgeable student of foreign aid, Amos A.
Jordan, has also presented a case against the cost critics
of military assistance. Of particular interest is the fact
that while Jordan's views were written in 1958, they are
still appropriate some eight years later. In attacking the
critics of foreign aid who maintain the United States cannot
%obert S. McNamara, "The Defense of the Free World,"
Department of State Bulletin , Vol. L, No. 1302, June 8, 1964
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 899.
Italics not in original. Source: John F. Kennedy,
"Foreign Aid, 1963/' Robert A. Goldwin (ed.) Why Foreign Aid ?
(Chicago: Rand McNally Company, 1963), p. 13"2T~

161
indefinitely afford a large scale military assistance program,
Jordan argues that there is a certain limit below which mili-
tary aid cannot fall and yet tie meaningful. As he has suc-
cinctly stated, "just as a dike ten feet high cannot cope
with a twenty-foot flood crest, " cutting the minimum
acceptable aid level by one half will not still produce 50
per cent of the minimum acceptable level of security.
Jordan further points out that it is virtually impossible
to accurately assess the intangible benefits of aid. Mili-
tary assistance gives tangible evidence to recipients that
the United States is willing to give more than mere moral
support. The determination of a smaller state to make the
necessary sacrifices for mutual defense often varies in
direct proportion with the material assistance granted by
the United States. Jordan further argues that aid produces
a "defense multiplier effect," to borrow an economic phrase.
This "multiplier" increases the recipient's total defense
posture to a greater level than the. original grant or the
original capability of the recipient. Or to use another eco-
nomic analogy, military assistance can raise a recipient's
capability to a "take-off point," after which it can develop
a credible posture by self-generation. Consequently, Jordan
maintains that it is far cheaper to create local military
strength out of indigenous forces than to rely on a "Fortress
America" strategy or on American expeditionary forces. In
summary, Jordan has held that
:
No one can pretend that an annual outlay of two
billion dollars is . . . /an optimum amount"/ . . .




instrument which can be applied to any and all
problems. It is clear too., that in some cases,
money has been wasted and that in most cases
results have not measured up to expectations.
Yet, in .the main, there has been progress
toward the policy's goal of building mutual
security of the free world. 11
ECONOMIC AID VERSUS MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Other critics of military assistance have held that
it is humanitarianly negative in nature because it reduces
the amount of economic aid which could be dispersed in its
place. This argument presupposes that economic and military
aid have mutually exclusive aims and benefits. In addition,
such critics hold that not only does military assistance
decrease the amount of humanitarian work that the United
States could conduct throughout the world, but that military
assistance actually decreases the ability of recipients to
improve their own lot because American military assistance
supports a world armament race and thus diverts the resources
of poorer nations from economic investment into military
expenditures
.
To respond to the second criticism, one may offer a
human analogy. Most men have a desire to prosper. But,
before they can prosper and succeed in their life's goals,
they must first insure that they live. In a like way,
although nations and their governments have the obligation
Amos A. Jordan, Jr., "Military Assistance and




to insure and enhance the well-being of the citizenry, they
must first insure the physical and political independence of
the people. This study has endeavored to present adequate
evidence that military assistance has helped insure the inde-
pendence of United States' allies. But in doing so, has
military assistance detracted from the economic well-being
of recipient states? One student of this problem has made a
detailed study of it. In his summary conclusions, he has
wr it t e n
:
'Economic aid' versus 'military aid' is largely a
false issue--rather they generally support one
another. First, even in cases where economic
development is judged to be a key objective, it
is not always clear that a given amount of economic
aid is more conducive to economic growth than is an
equivalent amount of military aid. This is es-
pecially so for some Latin American countries, for
example, where assistance for internal security is
predicated on the grounds that the military has an
essential role as a stabilizing influence in these
countries. Second, it can be argued that in re-
sults—if not in labels—the two are almost inter-
changeable in that military aid will release
resources and funds to the recipient country for
diversion into other uses and vice versa.
Finally,
. . .
direct spillover effects from
military assistance— like infrastructure expendi- .
tures and civic action programs, like roads and
harbor construction, communication and sanitation
facilities— clearly have economic aspects. 12
12
Capt. Douglas N. Jones, "Economic Aspects of Mili-
tary Assistance," Air University Review , Vol. XVI, No. 1
(Nov. -Dec. 1964), pp. 42-46. For another perceptive analysis
on the subject of economic versus military assistance which
includes meaningful appraisal of the true costs of military
assistance, see: Robert E. Asher, Grants, Loans, and Local




THE CESSATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
As a final point to be made in answering the critics
of military -assistance, an examination should be made of the
effects of a sizable reduction, or a complete cessation, of
military assistance. This very topic was the subject of a
study conducted by the Rand Corporation. Six basic con-
clusions were reached:
1. If the United States would reduce military aid,
it would encourage its allies to do the same.
This factor is enormously important because it is
just within recent years that the United States
has been able to induce its developed allies to
carry a greater share of the costs of mutual
defense. A United States cut-back would tend to
encourage its allies to decrease their program.
2. By granting military assistance, the United
States acquires intelligence information from its
recipients and enhances goodwill and understanding
between its allies. Part of these advantages
would certainly be lost if military assistance
were decreased.
3. A decrease in military assistance would tend to
create a power vacuum which the Communists would
endeavor to fill.
4. A decrease in military assistance to certain states





5. A decrease in the strength of the American allies
would require an increase in United States power
and in the end would cost more than the saving
in assistance funds
.
6. Military assistance in some countries, for
example Korea, is a prime requisite for main-
taining a stable government. If military aid
were decreased in such countries, it is possible
that the government would collapse and thus lead
to a Communist regime. J
The conclusion to be drawn from these comparisons is
that military assistance has been a valuable, probably vital,
tool of American national security and diplomacy. It con-
tinues to be valuable, and it must be continued for at least
the intermediate future. It also appears to be quite clear
that it is most difficult to evaluate precisely its per-
formance in the pursuit of the- American national interests;
yet, this fact does not prove that it is not valuable. Its
value, at worst, has been as a deterrent against Communist
aggression. But there is strong evidence that military assist-
ance has been a vital instrument for insuring the security
of the members of the American alliance system and promoting
the United States goal of peace and world order.
^Egon Neuberger, "Foreign Aid— Is It Worth Continu-
ing?" (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation,




Military assistance has been a valuable tool of
American national strategy and diplomacy. It has enabled
the United States to create its alliance system of mutual
defense. Through this alliance system, the United States
has been able to exert a substantial influence in the
nations and organizations which receive American military
assistance. At the same time, military assistance has created
a world-wide military establishment which the United States
leads and which has been of critical importance to the United
States in its opposition to the expansionism of the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China. During the past
twenty years, military assistance has aided in filling power
vacuums throughout the world which were caused by World War
II. By filling these power vacuums, the United States has
created a degree of world stability which would not have
been possible if the United States had followed a policy of
disengagement as it did following World War I. These
twenty years of relative peace have enabled the world to
catch its breath after the cataclysm of World War II and has
created the atmosphere wherein the world may be cautiously
hopeful for a continued era of peaceful development. It is
not insignificant that in the year 1965 the world witnessed
an unheralded milestone. As the year ended, the world could
observe that it had somehow contrived to live through a
longer period of freedom from general world war than had
lasted between The Great War and the Second World War. To a
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decisive degree, it has been American world leadership which
has prevented a renewed world conflagration, and military-
assistance has been one of the vital tools used by American
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